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Introduction 
It may be argued that in this modern era of computers, automobiles and terrorism there is 
no use for the past. It is seen as something that is either the dry plaything of academics or 
the weapon of foreign demagogues. The past is seen as something that is abstract and not 
applicable to the modern world. For example, how can the petty conflicts of long dead 
kings and emperors provide a lesson in an age where war is never declared, democracy is 
sovereign, and a single missile can annihilate an entire country? Surely our distance from 
the past prohibits any such parallels. History, with its dry musings about ruins and ‘-
isms’, has faded into dull irrelevancy and historians with their ‘intellectual masturbation’ 
are only good for parlor tricks and ‘fun facts’ at parties and social gatherings. 
 Once I was speaking to a man about the current state of world affairs, particularly 
about the war in Iraq. I, an ardent critic of the war, argued that the United States should 
realize its mistake in the war and take action to withdraw honorably. I am not, nor was I 
ever, so naïve about that war that I would really suggest leaving; I was merely playing 
devil’s advocate to the obviously conservative man, the sort of Central Pennsylvanian 
Republican that surrounded my very Democratic, Western Pennsylvanian family. The 
man adamantly disagreed with my position. His response was not surprising but his 
reasoning was. Knowing that I was a History major, he felt that he should frame his 
argument in terms that I would understand. The United States needed to fight the 
‘barbarians’ so they would not come to America and topple the shining beacon of 
civilization. He was thoroughly convinced that the Untied States was the new Rome and 
the Islamic extremists were nothing more than backward savages that could not bear to 
see the light of American achievement stand. To him, Americans have the duty to do 
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what the Romans could not do, that is, keep their empire together and prevent the world 
from plunging into darkness for a thousand years! 
 My companion’s ill-informed opinion showed me two things that would 
eventually influence the writing of this paper. First, it demonstrated that history is still 
alive and relevant in the present. This man, who has a standard American public 
education, was dimly aware of the events that led to the fall of the Roman Empire. Not 
only did he know only the basic narrative of this complex historical process, but he also 
used that history to influence his own political mentality. Secondly, the concept of a 
modern barbarian was still alive outside the pages of R.E. Howard. Not only that, but 
these barbarians were not relegated to the wild places of the world, but constituted a large 
population in this man’s eyes. Simply put, these barbarians were the enemy and needed to 
be stopped. 
 I had seen, in my lifetime, the American perspective of the Islamic east change 
from a land that supplied oil, to a savage land filled with wild-eyed Islamic terrorists. I 
had seen the process of a people being demonized with the use of history. American 
foreign policy with the Middle East had turned into American-barbarian relations. I saw 
the same things that I had always read about in my history books: rampant xenophobia, a 
divide and conquer mentality, and the rhetoric of ‘civilizing’ the barbarians, which now 
had been given a new name, ‘democratization.’ The US was not only undergoing these 
ancient processes, it also had to reconcile its new position with the millions of multi-
ethnic Americans that made up its population. I recognized that if these things were 
happening now, it was worth investigating them in the past. However, it was not only 
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necessary to study such processes in the west; I needed to see such developments from 
another temporal/spatial perspective and, more specifically, a comparative one. 
Focus of Research 
The Late Roman Republic was an era of unprecedented expansion that brought the 
Romans into contact with many peoples that would eventually be conquered and 
subsumed within the greater Roman Empire. However, no foreign conquest would 
capture the minds of the Romans more than their interaction with the peoples of Gaul. 
The Romans had created their empire in the presence of the Gauls, whom they 
historically both feared and respected. Early conflict during Rome’s early history and the 
willingness of the peoples of Gaul to participate in Rome’s foreign wars and political 
strife created an image of ferocity and aggressiveness. This relationship created an 
interesting place for these so-called ‘Gauls’ in Roman society once they were conquered 
by Caesar during the 50s B.C.E.  
 Han China also is known famously within historical circles for its barbarian 
relations, particularly for its long conflicts with the Xiongnu, pastoralist peoples that 
inhabited much of the territory of modern day Mongolia. As the first long-lasting unified 
Chinese dynasty, the Han created what is known today as the Chinese empire. They dealt 
with the ideas of expansion and the problem of spreading Chinese influence over the 
entire area of East Asia. The Han were also known for the fact that they were strong-
armed by the very peoples, such as the Xiongnu, they wished to conquer for a full sixty 
years.  
 Both Rome and China would eventually conquer and a least partially bring such 
neighboring peoples into their empire. While they both had a similar early relationship, 
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and conquered peripheral peoples in similar ways, the means by which they assimilated 
the conquered peoples was very different. This difference stems from the fact that each 
empire defined themselves and their people differently. Rome defined itself legally while 
China defined itself culturally. I propose that it was specifically these definitions that 
shaped each empire’s relationships with what they considered to be barbarian populations 
on their periphery.  Each culture reacted to the other according to their own self definition 
and identity, identities which were shaped through contact, exchange and at times 
warfare.  As such, the influence and evolution of each empire’s identity can be seen in 
each stage of the relationships they created with neighboring territories and their peoples.  
Thesis Structure 
I have divided the chronology of the stages noted above into three parts: 1)  pre-conquest, 
2) conflict, 3) and post-conquest. In pre-conquest relations, I will discuss each 
civilization’s early relations with their barbarian groups. Both Rome and China 
encountered and interacted with aggressive neighboring populations before they became 
large empires themselves. The pre-conquest relations section seeks to analyze the 
structure and characteristics of these early interactions to determine how patterns of 
eventual animosity may have formed.  
The conflict section focuses on the unique strategies that were employed by both 
empires to eventually conquer their neighbors. In this case, each civilization’s conflicts 
with barbarians are an integral part of what may be called the barbarian relations 
narrative and as such reveals a great deal about each culture’s attitudes and perceptions 
of their conquered neighbors. Moreover, by investigating the processes that led to the 
eventual conquering of such peoples, it is possible to learn about their social structure. In 
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much the same way as an engineer studies structural collapse, we can glean a great deal 
of information on a non-literate society’s socio-political organization by studying how it 
shifted under pressure and eventually collapsed through interaction with powerful 
neighboring empires.  
The assimilation section shows how each empire assimilated the conquered 
barbarians. This section aims to show that each empire assimilated barbarians according 
to their own identity. The Chinese sought to make the conquered ‘Xiongnu’ culturally 
Chinese, while the Romans sought to make the ‘Gauls’ legally Roman. By looking at 
how each empire assimilated its barbarian neighbors we can see how they defined 
themselves. Each phase of the narrative is brought together with a comparison section, 
where both cases are examined side by side.           
Recent Trends in the Study of Identity and Culture Change 
In researching such historical events and processes for this thesis, the topic of ‘identity’ 
and recent scholarship surrounding its interpretation was an important consideration. This 
topic has received a great deal of attention from scholars over the last decade.1 In the 
modern age it is hard to imagine how ancient peoples defined themselves without the 
concept of the nation. There is no doubt that all human groups seek to define themselves 
and stand away from those that they consider foreign. It is a process that spans continents 
and millennia and can be seen from the earliest people of Eurasia, to the street gangs of 
modern cities. The human need for group cohesion and identity has motivated conflict 
and cooperation throughout human history. This process is never stronger than when a 
                                                 
1 Sian Jones, The Archaeology of Ethnicity (London: Routledge, 1997)., Peter Wells, The Barbarians Speak 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).; Peter S. Wells, Beyond Celts Germans and Scythians, ed. 
Richard Hodges, Duckworth Debates in Archaeology (London: Duckworth, 2001).; R. Brian Ferguson and 
Neil L. Whitehead, War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare (Santa Fe School of 
American Research Press, 1992). 
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group is faced with a neighbor that is fundamentally different in some way.2 Such 
‘Others’ were frequently featured in the writings of many early civilizations. While many 
cultures fought, fraternized, and feared the Other they were inexorably linked, for the 
Other was often the catalyst for the formation of their identity. In the case of Rome and 
China this identity was precipitated by peripheral groups that were present in their early 
histories. Rome would create a legal and constitutional identity spurred on by their 
perceived governmental differences from the peoples of Gaul. China would create a 
cultural definition based on their lifestyle differences from the peoples called Xiongnu. 
Both empires would keep this early definition throughout their imperial history.    
However, the formation of a group identity is not the end of the process. As these 
powerful groups emerged as empires, they would come to conquer and assimilate the 
very groups that had contributed to bringing them into ‘being’. After the conquest, they 
would bring these peripheral groups into the identity that they had helped create. Each 
empire assimilated their subjects according to their own group identity. The Romans 
would use citizenship as a powerful motivator for bringing the Gauls into the 
constitutional and legal entity that was the Roman Empire. The Chinese, on the other 
hand, urged and sometimes coerced the conquered Xiongnu into adopting the Chinese 
way of life. To do this, it was necessary for some Xiongnu peoples to abandon their 
nomadic ways of life.              
 This paper examines the process of barbarian relations and hopes to not only 
explore the historical events of each case study, but also to examine the anthropological 
process at work within barbarian relations.  It can be seen in each case study that each 
barbarian group had an impact on the state society’s sense of collective identity and that 
                                                 
2 Wells, Beyond Celts Germans and Scythians, 22. 
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each empire helped precipitate the formation of the tribal society’s identity. Once formed, 
these identities clashed in open armed conflict. Once defeated, each barbarian group was 
brought into the identity of its conqueror differently according the conqueror’s identity. 
The Romans, who had defined themselves through their constitution and laws, absorbed 
the Gauls by incorporating their nobility into the Roman administrative framework. This 
administrative framework then facilitated natural Roman cultural assimilation. The 
Chinese, who defined themselves culturally, created a policy of cultural assimilation that 
facilitated the administration of the surrendered Xiongnu. By first assimilating the 
Xiongnu culturally, the Chinese were able to manage them with their normal 
administrative system and secure those lands that had been traditionally in Xiongnu 
hands. Identity plays a key role throughout such social and cultural change. However, it 
is not a one-way process as the barbarians had just as big a role in the formation of the 
state identity as the state had in the formation of the barbarian’s identity.      
This comparative study’s large breadth and scope is at once a blessing and a curse for its 
undergraduate author. It is able to ‘zoom out’ and draw larger conclusions about the 
interaction between non-literate tribal societies and literate organized states as a broader 
historical/anthropological phenomenon. Also, when juxtaposed against a completely 
distinct society, new insights can be gained about both Rome and China that could not be 
learned from just studying them individually.  Lastly, it draws inspiration from a number 
of sub-disciplines (i.e. Anthropology, Archaeology, etc.) in order to examine these 
important historical processes that both shaped the neighboring peoples and territories at 
the periphery of Rome and China, but also the empires themselves. Such a comparative 
approach, of course, has its definite disadvantages because of such a broad scope. For 
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example, during the research and writing of this paper, the author stumbled across the 
many nuances of steppe societies, fell into the study of Celtic and Germanic linguistics, 
and was caught in the crossfire of the Indo-European debate. One could very easily make 
an entire academic career exploring the topic of comparative barbarian relations! 
Nevertheless, through undertaking this comparative analysis, many important and 
complex processes associated with culture contact, historical change and the development 
of new socio-political structures were revealed to the author and the utility of such studies 
became acknowledged through the process of writing.  In sum, it has been a very 
enlightening project. 
Han and Xiongnu Pre-Conquest Relations 
To better understand the relationship between Han China and its nomadic neighbors, it is 
necessary to look at the frontier as a geographical and cultural region.  Owen Lattimore, 
writing in the 1930’s, states that northwest China developed economically at the end of 
the Neolithic period, when many groups transitioned from hunting and gathering to either 
agriculture or pastoral nomadism.3 Lattimore suggests that the primary economic activity 
of a group was determined by the climate and suitableness of the land for either farming 
or herding; the people of the Chinese plain, with its temperate moist soil adopted farming 
while the people of the Mongolian steppes adopted herding as their primary means of 
support.4 Christian suggests that pastoralists and agriculturalists differentiated at the end 
of the last ice age during the so-called “Neolithic revolution.”5   
                                                 
3 Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (Boston: Beacon Pres, 1962), 55. 
4 Ibid. 
5 David Christian, A History of Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 1998), 
70. 
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 Another theory suggests that the differentiation between Chinese agriculture and 
central Asian pastoralism arose as a result of desiccation of the northern reaches of the 
frontier.  It is thought that the area that was the Chinese/Xiongnu frontier was suitable for 
intense agriculture until several centuries before written records.  Climatic change then 
began to dry out the northern grasslands until people were forced to rely on their herds 
for their livelihood.6 This theory may explain the isolated pockets of agriculturalists deep 
within regions normally considered to be nomadic.       
 There is, however, no definite line that separates the pastoral peoples and 
agricultural peoples in Eastern Asia.  The frontier is a gradual transition from agricultural 
plain to semi-arid steppe.  Also, the transition is not uniform.  The frontier region was a 
patchwork of varying climates that forced early communities to adapt to specific local 
conditions in order to survive.   Some groups living there developed a mixed economy 
that included both agriculture and herding, thereby creating a cultural and economic zone 
that was neither Chinese nor barbarian.  In fact, the people of this region were sometimes 
considered completely separate from either the Xiongnu or the Chinese.7 
 As the economic differences between the sedentary and nomadic societies of the 
northwest frontier became greater, so did their cultural differences.  Culture is often 
defined by economic realities and local conditions that shape the way of life and customs 
of specific groups. In the case of the Han, and peoples inhabiting their northern borders, 
this difference arose out of their two vastly different ways of life.    
                                                 
6 Nicola Di Cosmo, "Ancient Inner Asian Nomads: Their Economic Basis and Its Significance in Chinese 
History," The Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 4 (1994): 1094. 




The nomadic culture of the Xiongnu was one of power and movement.  A nomadic 
society derives its wealth, power and lifeblood from the vast herds of animals that it 
shepherds from one grazing land to another; using them for food, clothing and shelter.  A 
large herd of animals, which represents significant wealth for the owner, can be destroyed 
very quickly either by disease or famine.  Also, herds are more easily stolen than 
sedentary forms of wealth, since they can move under their own power.  As a 
consequence, nomad society put a heavy emphasis on mobility and the ability to protect 
the herds, which required horsemanship and martial prowess.  The precariousness of the 
nomad economy created a culture that had very little use for luxury items.  Land was not 
valued in the same way as in sedentary societies. Ownership of land was not important, 
but the right to move upon the land and extract its resources was of paramount 
importance. Pastoralist economies produced very few prestige goods.8  That being said, it 
does not mean that the nomad nobility did not partake in some of the finer things.  These 
were, however, a means of showing power and influence.  In order to both increase and 
sustain social power, nomad ‘chiefs’ held feasts and redistributed wealth. Such wealth 
often comprised non-local or prestige items that were not available locally. A steady 
supply of such wealth was required in order to maintain a foundation of political 
authority and social power. In the case of the Xiongnu, wealth was extracted from various 
weaker sedentary and pastoralist groups.9   
                                                 




Chinese culture was built around the large and productive fields that provided the 
subsistence base of millet and wheat that fed the Chinese state. Agriculture inherently 
puts a value on land and the skill and labor to work it.  Agriculture differs from 
nomadism in that the products derived from farming can be stored for the long term.  
Grain could be put in silos for later use and did not need to be maintained once it was 
harvested.  Agriculture was also more productive than nomadism, which allowed the 
Chinese to develop urban centers full of specialists who were free to pursue trades that 
were not involved with farming.  These urban centers also became the nexus of political 
power in the Chinese state as lords in the cities administered the farming villages in the 
countryside.  This system created a need for competent administrators and leaders to 
manage the large infrastructure that directed the distribution of food and other products.  
Often, the most competent managers were those who were older and more experienced.  
The old were also held in high regard as keepers of knowledge that made the fields 
productive.   
 Agricultural surpluses meant that large armies of peasant conscripts could be 
raised.  Early on, it was discovered that martial skill could be overcome with sheer 
numbers.  What greatly supports battles in a sedentary society is not the prowess of the 
individual soldier, but his ability to stay sustained in battle. The ability of the Han 
military generals was also an important factor.  The most powerful members of Chinese 
society were those who could lead others and ensure the livelihood of the peasants under 
them.  Luxury goods, while more abundant, were less important as a symbol of political 
power than in nomad society.  Members of Chinese society who were prosperous were 
not necessarily politically powerful.  For example, merchants commanded a great deal of 
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wealth in Chinese society.  They were, however, kept out of positions of leadership 
during the Qin and Han dynasties.  Land was a greater symbol of power in Chinese 
society.  Whoever owned land not only possessed monetary wealth, but also the human 
labor that lived on their lands. 
The ill-defined northern frontier presented a difficulty for the Chinese in setting a 
natural delineation between what was Chinese and what was not.  Many leaders tried to 
initiate zones of ‘Chineseness’, which became gradually more ‘barbaric’ as the distance 
from China increased.10 The idea of these zones permeated the thoughts of Han policy 
makers.  Han political policy differentiated barbarian groups into various categories 
based on their “nearness” to China.11 These categories, in reality, had very little to with 
geography and physical distance and rather focused on the group’s relationship in terms 
of culture and friendliness to the Han government.  Groups that had submitted to Han rule 
and taxation were considered “inner” barbarians while groups who were outside of the 
Han sphere of influence were considered “outer” barbarians.12 By putting groups in these 
categories, the Han administration incited internecine conflict between various pastoralist 
peoples.13  
Nevertheless, the Chinese “zone” model was not entirely accurate.  While it was 
true that the frontier could be distinguished into zones, the frontier was not an even 
gradation.  Even today the boundary between China and Mongolia is a not a steady 
gradation.  It is, in many places, a patchwork of varying landscapes and climates.  This 
patchwork further frustrated Chinese frontier policy makers in creating a secure frontier.  
                                                 
10 Yü Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure of Sino-Barbarian Economic 
Relations (Berkeley: University of California Press 1967), 66. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 67. 
13 Ibid., 14. 
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Trying to distinguish what was Chinese and what was not was a task partly accomplished 
by the Great Wall.14 The wall, besides being a fortification, was a checkpoint and a very 
visible line of demarcation between what was considered to be civilization and what was 
thought of as barbarism. By building the Great Wall, the Chinese were able to create a 
physical and mental barrier between the often ill-defined regions of ‘civilization’ and 
‘barbarism’.15   Nevertheless, mixed economic groups on either side of the wall would 
pass through it in order to graze their herds or trade with groups beyond the wall.  This 
proved to be a problem in times of war, particularly when China was trying to stop the 
people on the frontier from aiding the enemy.16   
 China’s northwest frontier was a fluid, heterogeneous region that was a major 
factor in shaping Chinese frontier policy.  The interface between nomadic and sedentary 
civilizations created an immense area that was very different from China proper.  Its 
varied geography and its mixed economy created an administrative challenge throughout 
the Han dynasty.  Despite the barrier of the Great Wall and a garrison of Chinese troops 
and friendly barbarians, the northwest frontier was porous and often allowed hostile 
tribes to raid Chinese territory.  The Han dynasty’s greatest barbarian adversary, the 
Xiongnu, would use this open frontier to extort China for several decades prior to 
emperor Wu.  
Even though the Chinese were aware of other pastoralist groups to the West and 
North, it was the specifically the Xiongnu confederation that Sima Qian focuses on in his 
account of the Han dynasty. In Sima Qian, there are several pastoralist groups mentioned 
                                                 
14 Pu Muzhou, Enemies of Civilization: Attitudes toward Foreigners in Ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and 
China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 126. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Michael Loewe, Records of Han Administration 2 vols., vol. 1 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 63. 
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in the areas that would be occupied by the Xiongnu, notably the Rong and Di tribes who 
were expelled from the region south of the bend of the Yellow river by Meng Tian.17 
This being said, Sima Qian writes, shortly after mentioning the Rong and Di, that Meng 
Tian “had struck terror into the Xiongnu people”.18 This seems to indicate that the 
Chinese recognized the Xiongnu as a unified political force, but were also aware that they 
were a tribal confederation with distinct constituent parts. This is not surprising, since 
these pastoralist groups had been in contact with Chinese border states for centuries. To 
ensure a secure border and reliable mercenaries, Chinese rulers, whether from the warring 
states or the imperial court, would need to be keenly aware of the political situation in the 
steppes. However, Christian states that the Xiongnu confederation emerged around 200-
133 B.C.E.  This is too late to be contemporaneous with anything in the Qin dynasty 
(221-206 B.C.E.).19 It may be that Sima Qian is reading from a source that mentions the 
Rong and Di and just assumes that they were members of the Xiongnu confederation at 
the time. Nevertheless, he still recognizes these tribes as members of the “Xiongnu”. The 
Chinese knowledge of steppe polities can also be seen in later accounts of the Xiongnu. 
In these accounts other, non Xiongnu tribes are mentioned.20 These are usually tribes that 
are potentially friendly to the Han court. It seems likely that the name Xiongnu was a 
generic term used to denote nomads that were hostile to the Han court. However, 
Christian suggests that the term Xiongnu recognized one of the three major pastoralist 
organizations of the period: the Xiongnu, Tung-hu and Yüeh-chih.21  
                                                 
17 Sima Qian, Records of the Grand Historian: Qin Dynasty,  (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993), 207-08. 
18 Ibid., 208. 
19 Christian, A History of Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia, 184. 
20 Sima, Records of the Grand Historian: Han Dynasty II,152-53. Here, the Hunye and Xiutu tribes are 
only considered distinct entities when they surrender to China.  
21 Christian, A History of Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia, 184. 
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 The Xiongnu confederacy rose to power within Inner Mongolia around the same 
time as the Han dynasty emerged from the ashes of the fallen Qin in the early second 
century B.C.E.  The nomads felt that there was a definite threat from a resurgent Chinese 
empire.22 As a result, the Xiongnu created a powerful nomadic empire – the likes of 
which would not be seen again until the Mongols and Genghis Kahn in the 13th century 
C.E.  Through force and fear they would extort the Han government into an embarrassing 
treaty that would become a blight on Chinese foreign policy for years.   
 During the early years of the Han, the Xiongnu raided the frontier zone taking 
goods and killing Chinese citizens.  To ameliorate the problem, the Chinese created the 
Heqin treaty to keep the barbarian raiders at bay.  The treaty stipulated that the Han court 
would provide goods such as silk and grain, as well as a Han princess to go to the 
Xiongnu court as a hostage.  In return, the Xiongnu would promise not to raid the 
Chinese frontier.23  
The Heqin treaty was thinly masked bribery, which was absolutely necessary for 
both the early Han government and the Xiongnu Empire.  The Xiongnu posed a very real 
military threat to the Han government, which was weakened by years of civil war.  At 
one point, a large Xiongnu raid managed to get within sight of the capitol.24 According to 
Psarras, the Han had always had the resources, both military and economic, to deal with 
the Xiongnu.25 However, those resources were tied up in huge infantry armies that were 
slow to muster and ponderous to command.  These armies were well suited for the large 
set piece battles of the Warring States period (452-221 B.C.E.), but were unsuited for the 
                                                 
22 Cosmo, "Ancient Inner Asian Nomads: Their Economic Basis and Its Significance in Chinese History," 
1093. 
23 Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China, 41. 
24 Sima, "Records of the Grand Historian: Han Dynasty II," 145. 
25 Sophia-Karin Psarras, "Han and Xiongnu," Monumenta serica 51 (2003): 64. 
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fast raiding warfare that the Xiongnu practiced.  While armies in the north had cavalry, 
they were slow to deploy as well and were too small a force to be effective.26 During the 
raid of 167 B.C.E.,  the Han mustered an army of 1,000 chariots and 100,000 cavalry.27 
While this may seem like an overwhelming military response, it must be remembered that 
military force means nothing if it cannot be both managed and applied in battle 
effectively.  During this early period of interaction, the Han seemed to have trouble 
projecting power within Central Asia and their empire.  A key difference between the 
Xiongnu cavalry forces and those of the Han is stamina.  The vast majority of Xiongnu 
men were not only citizens, but soldiers always training to fight in the saddle, while the 
Han troops on the other hand were part-time conscripts.  Xiongnu horsemen were always 
ready to fight either as an attack or defense force, while the Han cavalry had to be called 
up, organized, and then sent after the Xiongnu raiders.  By the time the Han had 
organized the appropriate military response, the Xiongnu had completed their raid and 
were safely across the border.  Han cavalry also needed a large baggage train for support 
and were a significant drain on the state resources when deployed.  For this reason, pre-
Wudi emperors would not keep the armies against Xiongnu raids in the field for long and 
would not follow the Xiongnu raiders across the border.   
An interesting example of the pre-Wudi militaries cumbersomeness is reflected in 






                                                 
26 Chun-shu Chang, "Military Aspects of Han Wu-Ti's Northern and Northwestern Campaigns," Harvard 
Journal of Asiatic Studies 26 (1966): 167. 
27 Psarras, "Han and Xiongnu," 139. 
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Emperor Wen appointed the Palace military commander 
Zhou She and the chief of palace attendants Zhang Wu as 
generals and put them in command a force of 1,000 
chariots and 100,000 horsemen…The Shanyu remained 
within the borders of the empire for a little over a month 
and then withdrew.  The Han forces pursued him beyond 
the frontier but returned without having been able to kill 
any of the enemy.28       
 
 During a raid, the Xiongnu would mass within their territory and across the 
border into the frontier region and beyond.  There they would pillage and burn whatever 
they could.  Once news arrived that a Chinese army was mustering, they retreated back 
across the border.29 The raid was meant to be destructive and frightening, in order to 
intimidate the Han court.  That being said, as Thomas Barfield argues, the Xiongnu had 
no intention to conquer China or dismantle the Han regime.30 The Xiongnu needed the 
Heqin in order to keep tribute flowing and ultimately to retain strong political alliances 
with other tribal entities.  
The Xiongnu system was a sort of “reverse feudal” system where the Xiongnu 
chief, or Shanyu, would distribute gifts to his immediate subordinates in order to ensure 
their loyalty. These individuals would in turn distribute some of these gifts down to their 
immediate subordinates.  These gifts would trickle down from the Shanyu, all the way 
down to petty Xiongnu officials who held titles such as “Master of One Hundred” or 
“Master of Ten.”31  These titles were part of the highly organized decimal system that 
was created by the Xiongnu. Such a system was useful for administering smaller tribal 
units of a few thousand at the most, and was obviously very dependent on the success of 
                                                 
28 Qian, Records of the Grand Historian: Han Dynasty II, 145. 
29 Ibid.   
30 Thomas J. Barfield, "The Hsiung-Nu Imperial Confederacy: Organization and Foreign Policy," The 
Journal of Asian Studies 41, no. 1 (1981): 54. 
31 Ibid., 49. 
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the Shanyu in acquiring gifts and wealth for redistribution.32  This is where the Heqin 
treaty became so important33 and ultimately essential in two important ways:  First, it 
created a steady supply of gifts that would not bankrupt the Chinese state, thus ensuring 
its continual supply.  Second, it buttressed the Shanyu’s position as leader of the 
Xiongnu, demonstrating that he was powerful enough to force concessions from the 
mighty Chinese empire.34 The Shanyu needed to prove that the Heqin treaty was a result 
of his power and authority.  The periodic renewing of the treaty whenever a new leader 
came to power or after a violation on either side was not only a reaffirmation of goodwill 
between China and the Xiongnu, but an act of supplication in the eyes of the Xiongnu.  
The treaty was renewed when a new Shanyu came to power to show that the Chinese 
were bowing to his power, not to the power of his predecessor.  The treaty was also 
renewed when a new Chinese emperor came to power in order for the Shanyu to show 
that he had this emperor under control in same way as the previous emperor.  The 
Chinese viewed this as arrogance and would later use it as a rationale for their military 
campaigns. A famous quote from the Shiji, by Zhonghang Yue, a turncoat Han official, to 
the Chinese ambassadors illustrates this very well: 
Not so much talk from the Han envoys! Just make sure that the silks and 
grainstuffs you bring to the Xiongnu are of the right measure and quality, 
that’s all.  What’s the need for talking?  If the goods you deliver are up to 
measure and are of good quality, all right.  But if there is any deficiency or 
the quality is no good, then when the autumn harvest comes we will take 
our horses and trample all over your crops!35       
 
While it is true that the Shiji was written during the reign of Wudi and is to an extent a 
justification for Wudi’s campaigns against the Xiongnu, it can be reasonably imagined 
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that the Shanyu would act this way toward the Han envoys.  The Shanyu needed to assert 
his dominance over the Han in order to assert his dominance over his subordinates.  If the 
Shanyu did not show that he was in control, elements of his state would begin to fragment 
and initiate their own states independent of the Shanyu.   
 In 177 B.C.E., The Xiongnu official, the Wise King of the Right, led a massive 
raid on the frontier.  The raid followed the standard Xiongnu pattern, with the Xiongnu 
retreating once a Han army had been mustered.  The raid of 177 was different in that the 
Shanyu later apologized for the incident.  The letter recorded in the Shiji is polite, tactful 
and almost penitent.  In the letter the Shanyu assures the Emperor that the attack was not 
by his command and that the Wise King of the Right has been duly punished by 
reassignment.36 The letter gives an interesting insight into Xiongnu state and its foreign 
policy. 
 First, it gives us a glimpse into how the Xiongnu state worked internally.  The 
Wise King of the Right obviously disobeyed his leader, defied the Shanyu’s power and 
created a major diplomatic incident.  It could be easily imagined that a modern nation 
would accuse such a man of treason.  Nevertheless, the Wise King of the Right was given 
a relatively light sentence.  He was sent to a far western region where he conquered the 
Yuezhi.37 One would wonder why a rebellious noble like the Wise King of the Right 
would not be executed in a society where “in times of peace anyone who draws his sword 
farther than one foot from its scabbard is put to death.”38 The Wise King of the Right was 
one of the two subordinates directly under the Shanyu and was thus a very powerful 
noble.  In the Xiongnu system, a tribal leader was most likely loyal to his immediate 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 140. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 137.  
22 
superior, who provided him with the gifts and subsidies that kept him in his place within 
the pecking order.  The Wise King of the Right had half of the Xiongnu state beholden to 
him.  If the Shanyu would have moved to punish him, it could have caused a major civil 
conflict within the Xiongnu state.  A civil war would have been disastrous for the 
Xiongnu, who needed to present a united front in order to extract the tribute from the 
Chinese which kept the Xiongnu Empire together.  The possibility of civil war can be 
seen in the body of the letter itself.  The Han government, once it was aware of the divide 
within the Xiongnu, patiently waited to see what would happen next.  The Shanyu 
mentions this in the letter published in the Shiji: 
The emperor has twice sent letters complaining of the situation and I have 
in turn dispatched and envoy with my answer, but my envoy has not been 
allowed to return, nor has any envoy come from the Han.39 
  
The Han were most likely waiting to see how the situation developed across the frontier.  
A split in the Xiongnu would allow the Han to break the Xiongnu power and shift the 
political advantage in their favor, as they would do during the later Han dynasty.  The 
Shanyu defused the situation by reassigning the Wise King of the Right.  In the West, he 
was out of the way politically and was kept busy fighting another tribe.  The raid of 177 
says a great deal about the nature of the Shanyu’s power.  It shows that the Xiongnu state 
was a voluntary confederation, one that was very dependent on its leader’s personality 
and management skills.   
 The letter in the Shiji also speaks volumes about the relationship between the 
Xiongnu and the Han.  The letter shows how the Shanyu wished to reestablish the Heqin, 
once his domestic matters were resolved.  With the same stroke of the pen, the Shanyu 
explained away the breach of the treaty and coerced the emperor to return to the status 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 140. 
23 
quo.  The Shanyu even used the punishment of the Wise King of the Right to his 
advantage and even described  the Wise King’s conquests with a touch of pride.   
Through the aid of heaven, the excellence of his fighting men and the 
strength of his horses, he has succeeded in wiping out the Yuezihi, 
slaughtering and forcing to submission every member of the tribe.  In 
addition he has conquered the Loulan, Wusun, and the Hujie tribes, as 
well as twenty-six states nearby, so that all of them have become part of 
the Xiongnu nation.  All the people who live by drawing a bow are now 
united into one family and the entire region of the north is at peace.40  
 
In this passage the Shanyu is not only saying that, after a brief interruption, the Xiongnu 
house is in order, but also that it is larger and more powerful than ever.  The thinly veiled 
threat is followed by a commitment to peace, a desire to lay down arms and return to 
recent peaceful times, a time when petty Xiongnu kings knew their place, the inner 
barbarians didn’t revolt, and the Han court paid their dues to the Shanyu.  The Shanyu 
was back in a big way, and he wanted the Han court to know this.  With the letter came a 
token gift of a few horses and camels.41 
 The deliberation in the Han court was brief and decisive.  Sima Qian says that the 
decision was unanimous among the court advisors.  It was better to make peace with the 
Xiongnu rather than attack them, a decision that was made partly out of fear and partly 
out of pragmatism.  On one hand the Xiongnu were a solid threat again, a horse-mounted 
bully that was cracking its knuckles in front of the Han court after a brief illness.  On the 
other hand the Xiongnu had nothing the Emperor wanted.  Their lands were nothing but 
“swamps and saline wastes,” not worth the manpower or the money required to conquer 
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them.42 In the early decades of the Han dynasty, with its constant threat of rebellion, both 
needed to be used very wisely.   
The Shanyu’s letter was reciprocated with a polite reply, saying that the Shanyu’s 
words were “the way the sage rulers of antiquity would have spoken.”43 The Emperor 
agreed with the Shanyu’s terms only contending one point; the assertion that the Han 
frontier officials were responsible for the incident.  With the letter came a gift that far 
out-valued the gift given by the Shanyu.  While it seems that Han had rolled over and 
submitted to the barbarian, it must be remembered they were in a very precarious 
position.  The Han was still not settled as the ruler of all of China nearly a full fifty years 
after the end of the civil wars that spawned it.  Indeed, the idea of a unified China was 
only about 100 years old.  The threat of rebellions, whether from internal Chinese rebels 
or from the “inner barbarians” that encircled the empire, was ever present.  A war with 
the Xiongnu was nearly an open invitation for dissidents within the Han Empire to rise up 
in rebellion.  Throughout Chinese history, steppe nomads from the north have been used 
as tools by the various warring states.  Before Qin Shihaungdi, the states bordering the 
territories that would eventually belong to the Xiongnu had used the nomads as 
mercenaries and constructed walls to defend against them.  The thought of using the 
Xiongnu for political and military advantage had not died out after unification; it had just 
become more dangerous.  A plot against the Han government in 154 is recorded in the 
Shiji: 
A year or so later the emperor Wen passed away and emperor Jing came to 
the throne.  At this time Liu Sui, the king of Zhao, sent envoys in secret to 
negotiate with the Xiongnu.  When Wu, Chu, Zhao and the other states 
revolted, the Xiongnu planned to cooperate with Zhao and cross the 
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border, but the Han forces besieged and defeated the King of Zhao, and 
the Xiongnu called off their plans for an invasion.44 
     
The threat of internal rebellion was one of the main reasons that the pre-Wudi 
Han emperors needed to appease the Xiongnu.  The army needed to be close at hand in 
order to quickly squash internal rebels before they could solicit much Xiongnu help.  The 
imperial response to the rebellion was swift and surgical.  It was aimed at the head of the 
rebellion, the King of Wu, who had enlisted the aid of the other states as well as that of 
the Xiongnu.  The swift, precise response to this rebellion stands in marked contrast to 
the slow, almost clumsy responses to the Xiongnu incursions.  This reveals two things:  
Either the rebels were as slow to muster their forces as the Han government, therefore 
making the Han response seem swift, or the Han response was uncharacteristically fast 
given the dire danger of the event.  Either explanation shows some interesting qualities of 
the Han/Xiongnu relationship.  If the rebellion unfolded in the careful ponderous fashion 
of the warring states period, then the Xiongnu were biding their time during the Han civil 
strife in the same way that the Han sat back in 177.  If the rebellion was a quick affair, 
then it shows that the Han responses to the Xiongnu raids were not slow and inadequate 
by incompetence and feebleness, but by choice.  The Han knew that they were not able to 
respond quickly enough and therefore did not try to do so.  The Han armies were a mere 
formality, the final message to the Xiongnu to get out of the imperial borders.45 It seems 
that the former, rather than the latter, is the more likely explanation.  The Xiongnu were 
not sure with whom to throw in their lot.  This is further bolstered by the fact that the 
Xiongnu stopped their support of the rebellion once the king of Zhao was dead.  The 
Xiongnu knew that their favorable treaty was negotiable if the Han government ever fell 
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or was replaced with a new, more militarily proactive regime.  All the accounts of treaty 
breaks and wars between the Han and the Xiongnu beg the questions:  Was the Heqin 
treaty effective and beneficial to the Han?  Did they keep renewing the Heqin because it 
was a satisfactory solution to the longstanding barbarian problem, or because it was 
necessary or the survival of the early Han? 
Despite its being broken several times during its existence, the Heqin treaty gave 
many years of peaceful coexistence for both the Han and the Xiongnu.  If the period of 
the Heqin from 200-133 B.C.E. is examined, it can be seen that there were only three 
major breaks, which were quickly mended.46 From the Chinese point of view, these long 
periods of peace and cooperative trade must have seemed preferable to constant raids 
along the frontier.  While it may have been preferable to have a steady bilateral treaty, the 
Han dynasty simply did not have the ability to force a better deal.  The Heqin treaty was a 
settlement that was good for the time but could not be sustained, since there was nothing 
keeping the Xiongnu accountable for their end of the bargain.  The Xiongnu knew this 
and used this to periodically attack to renegotiate the treaty.47 Over the course of the 
Heqin treaty the Xiongnu become bolder and bolder in regard to their raids.  What was 
once a treaty that required a Han princess and material tributes later came to include cash 
payments and trading rights.  The Han government was being bullied into ever increasing 
tribute.   
However, the biggest problem with the Heqin was not the economic concessions, 
but the language of political equality within the treaty.  The treaty stipulated that the Han 
and Xiongnu were “brother” states.  While the statement was worded in such a way that 
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the Han government was considered the “older” brother, it was still a political insult that 
was too much for the Han court to bear.48 Chinese political theory dictated that Chinese 
culture and government was the pinnacle of civilization.  By the time of Emperor Wu, the 
Han emperor, who was called the Son of Heaven, was thought to literally have a mandate 
from heaven.  The tributary relationship of the Han government with the Xiongnu was 
incompatible with this superiority theory.  There could not be two sons of Heaven, in the 
eyes of the Han court.  The increased tribute paid by the Han court not only increased the 
economic burden, but also increased the shame of the arrangement.   
The Xiongnu were not the only group of barbarians that offended the Chinese 
superiority theory.  South of the Han empire was the kingdom of the Nan Yue.  The 
province was conquered during the Qin dynasty, settled with convicts, and placed under 
the command of a military governor.  When the Qin dynasty began to collapse, the 
governor of the territory did not take part in the civil war, but sought to expand his own 
territory in the south of China.  Once the dust had settled and the Han had risen to power, 
the governor was enfoeffed as the King of Yue, pardoned for his previous aggression 
against southern China and given the joint tallies of a feudal lord.  The move was 
appeasement and stalling in its finest form.  Again, the early Han dynasty had other, more 
pressing internal troubles that prevented it from reigning in the errant province.   
Allowing a barbarian kingdom led by a former Han official was never meant to be 
a permanent solution to the problem.  Like the Xiongnu, the Nan Yue were offensive to 
the Han dynasty’s theory of political superiority.  Unlike the Xiongnu, however, they 
were not a serious threat to the stability of the empire in the early years of the dynasty.  
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The Nan Yue’s crime was that of inciting the ire of the Han court by flaunting their 
equality to the China, even going so far as setting up a parallel Chinese court in Yue.  
Suma Qian describes the actions of the King of Yue: 
He then began to ride around in a carriage with a yellow top, 
decorated with plumes on the left, and to call his orders “edicts” in 
imitation of the Han emperor, all of which were intended to show he was 
the equal of the ruler of China. 
 
The kings of Yue managed to mock the Han court with imitation for many years 
until they were targeted by Emperor Wu’s barbarian campaigns.                     
The Han decision to finally break the Heqin was part policy and part pragmatism.  
It was a decision that was a long time in the making, beginning during the reign of Wen-
di.49 Wen-di began a policy of consolidation and financial saving in order to shore up the 
empire to confront the Xiongnu.50 However, he did not live long enough to see the policy 
go into effect.  It would be up to his grandson, Wudi, to finally break the Xiongnu 
extortion. 
At the beginning of his reign, Wudi, like many Han emperors before him, 
renewed the Heqin, following the advice of his advisors.  He inherited from Wen-di a 
huge budget surplus and a China that had not been so firmly united since Qinshihaungdi.  
From the start of his reign, Wudi was determined to create a China that was the dominate 
power in the region, a China that had no equal.  A year after he renewed the Heqin, he 
hatched a plot to ambush the Shanyu and his retinue, which probably contained some of 
his successors.51 The plan involved a Chinese merchant who would lure the Shanyu deep 
into Chinese territory where the Han forces would surround, capture, or kill the Shanyu.  
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The intent was to decapitate the Xiongnu leadership and create a window of confusion 
that the Han would use to cripple the Xiongnu state.   
The plan failed with the Shanyu’s discovery of the plan.  The Xiongnu leader 
withdrew before the trap could be sprung.  The botched ambush was not without 
consequence, however.  It broke the Heqin permanently and launched the two empires 
into a war that would eventually reverse the tributary relationship between the Han and 
Xiongnu and would permanently fracture the Xiongnu state. 
 
Han Xiongnu Conflict 
The long wars between the Han and the Xiongnu raise a question in the context of the 
larger comparison to the Romans –  was there a conquest?  The wars present a problem in 
defining victory and defeat for either party in that they were low intensity, long term 
conflicts that did not have many stunning victories or defeats.  Often, the Chinese would 
make an expedition into Xiongnu territory and would not even encounter the Xiongnu. 
 The problems that the Han faced in fighting the Xiongnu stemmed from the fact 
that they were fighting a nomadic enemy.  The Xiongnu had no significant settlements 
and they carried their means of production with them.  The Han needed to defeat the 
Xiongnu in a different way than a sedentary enemy.  The Chinese would have to attack 
the Xiongnu’s flimsy political structure in order to defeat them.   
 After the failed attempt at ambushing the Shanyu in 133 B.C.E., the Han fell back 
on the defensive for several years.  Psarras attributes this to internal problems and famine 
in China.52 In 129 B.C.E., however, the campaigns began anew.  The wars were not 
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glorious campaigns where the Xiongnu fell or fled from the mighty Han armies.  On the 
contrary, for many years the Han lost all the engagements with the Xiongnu, often on 
Chinese soil.53 For the purposes of this discussion, I will be using the data put forth by 
Psarras. I must use this since I cannot read classical Chinese.  However, I can create an 
original analysis with the data provided.  Psarras defines a victory as an engagement 
where the Han suffer fewer casualties than the Xiongnu and a defeat as where the 
Xiongnu suffer few casualties than the Han.  Psarras also defines a draw as a Chinese 
expedition that encounters no Xiongnu.  On the surface, it appears that the Han 
campaigns were marginally successful at best and quagmires that hemorrhaged men and 
money at worst.  One must, however, look at the strategic goals of both sides before one 
can judge the Han campaigns as folly or vanity. 
 The Xiongnu were truly on the defensive in a highly mobile war.  The Shanyu 
wanted to keep the status quo, the Heqin treaty that ensured tribute, trading rights, and his 
own power.  It must be remembered that the Xiongnu state required the Heqin to provide 
enough Chinese tribute to maintain the Xiongnu leadership structure.  The Shanyu is 
immediately at a disadvantage if he cannot provide enough goods to his subordinates.  
Once the Heqin was broken in 133, the Shanyu needed to resort to raiding to provide the 
requisite tribal fuel.  It must also be remembered that by this time the Xiongnu had 
become somewhat dependent on Han finished goods and agricultural products.  The final 
break of the pre-Wudi Heqin also meant that the frontier markets were closed to the 
Xiongnu.  The Xiongnu’s need for trade goods from Chinese markets can be seen by the 
fact that individual Xiongnu would immediately come to the Chinese markets if there 
was even a small lull in the fighting.  The Xiongnu were bullies that were not ready for a 
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serious retaliation.  All they could do was to try to keep their state together and weather 
the onslaught. 
 The Han needed to break the Xiongnu power, preventing the Xiongnu from ever 
creating a Heqin situation again.  The Han needed to fight the Xiongnu in their own 
territory, destroying their armies and demonstrating that the Shanyu was incapable of 
fending off a concentrated Chinese assault.  The Chinese had an important advantage in 
completing this objective; stamina.  The Chinese had a greater number of resources at 
their disposal such as large cavalry armies that would mount expeditions into Xiongnu 
territory every year for nearly thirty consecutive years. 
 On the other hand, the Xiongnu did have an advantage over the Han troops.  They 
were more experienced horsemen than the Han’s peasant conscripts.  The Xiongnu could 
choose their fight very carefully.  If there was even a slight chance of Xiongnu defeat, 
they would simply not give battle to the Han armies.  They could also mount raids of 
their own into Han territories.  It was for this reason that the Xiongnu had more victories 
than the Han in most years.  Unfortunately, the Xiongnu were playing a losing game.  
The Xiongnu wars can be compared to an earlier Roman conflict, the second Punic War.  
In that case, the Carthaginians would win battle after battle against the Roman conscript 
armies.  The Carthaginians, however, lost in the long run because they could not turn 
their battlefield victories into any strategic gains.  Hannibal, the Carthaginian general, 
was unable to take any Roman towns, and was eventually forced to retreat due to lack of 
supplies and support as well as a Roman attack on the Carthaginian homeland.54  Much 
the same happened to the Xiongnu.  They would maul Han army after Han army, but 
could not turn these victories into any meaningful conquest.  The Han had enough men 
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and money to replenish their armies, season after season.  This eventually wore down the 
Xiongnu, who saw that their efforts were not affecting the Han campaigns.  For its part, 
the Han government kept up the pressure on the Xiongnu for a quite a few years despite 
some lingering internal problems and natural disasters.  Wudi kept internal dissent down 
by exclusively taxing the nobility and merchants, while leaving the peasants largely 
unscathed.55 The Han dynasty won the war not through superior generalship and military 
might, but through simple attrition.  The Xiongnu could, and did, fight very effectively 
against the perennial Chinese expeditions.  However, the constant pressure on the 
Xiongnu caused their political structure to splinter.56  As early as 105 B.C.E., these 
stresses started to crop up in the form of rivalries and the minor coups within the Xiongnu 
elite.  In the last decade of the second century B.C.E., the Shanyu, Zhanshilu’er, executed 
the Wise King of the Left for “plotting to assassinate him and surrender to the Han.”57 As 
long as the Chinese remained on the offensive and did not pay tribute, the Shanyu was in 
a precarious position.  He was no longer seen as the great and powerful leader that could 
coerce China into obedience, nor was he providing the tangible evidence of that power; 
the gifts extracted from the Chinese as tribute.  By refusing to knuckle under to the 
Xiongnu demands, the Han were robbing him of his legitimacy.  As early as 96 B.C.E., 
factionalism had taken the ‘teeth’ out of the Xiongnu threat.58 The war would go on for 
many years after Wudi’s death, the main difference being that the Xiongnu would not 
only be fighting the Chinese, but also themselves.  The Southern Xiongnu would 
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eventually surrender to the Chinese, seeking aid for their fight against the Northern 
Xiongnu.    
 The Chinese also cleared areas of the Gansu corridor along the Silk Road, 
solidifying their conquests with a string of forts and garrisons.  The Han government was 
never able to completely rid the conquered areas of Xiongnu.  However, it was able to 
minimize Xiongnu influence in these regions with their own more solid but shorter 
ranged military influence emanating from the forts. 
 Out of this long and somewhat indecisive tale of lightning raids and endless 
cavalry charges comes the question:  Who won, and was there a conquest?  The answer 
becomes a little clearer when one looks at what each party got out of the conflict.  The 
Chinese successfully broke the pre-Wudi Heqin for good.59  They were no longer being 
extorted into paying tribute to the Xiongnu and had gained land as well as a client state, 
the Southern Xiongnu.  While it is true that the Chinese would end up paying much more 
to the Xiongnu as a client state than as a “brother” state, it can be seen that they had 
achieved a great political victory.  They had engaged in a terrible war with the Xiongnu 
who were of more or less equal military capability, and had survived the confrontation 
while the Xiongnu had not.  This backed up the preexisting Chinese superiority theory.   
 The Xiongnu on the other hand, had failed to scare the Chinese into reestablishing 
the Heqin, and had fallen apart as an empire.  The now fractured Xiongnu could not exert 
their political will over the Chinese and other nomad groups.  The raids into China would 
continue for the rest of the Han dynasty, but would be much more minor than in the pre-
Wudi days.  Also, in the 60’s and 50’s B.C.E., the Xiongnu began surrendering to the 
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Han in droves, becoming client “inner barbarians.”  Once the Southern Xiongnu had 
surrendered, the Northern Xiongnu would continue to fight for much longer.  The 
Xiongnu Empire fell with a ‘sickly sputter’.  While it may not be as clear cut as Caesar’s 
campaigns in Gaul, the breakup of Xiongnu power and the dissolution of the Heqin show 
that there was, in fact, a conquest of a great many Xiongnu by the Chinese.  These 
Xiongnu would, in time, abandon their nomadic ways and be assimilated into the Chinese 
empire. 
 
Han-Xiongnu Post-Conquest Relations and Assimilation 
 It must be remembered when one is studying the Han-Xiongnu relationship after 
Wudi’s conquest, that the Xiongnu wars were still going on.  While it is true that the 
Xiongnu began to surrender piecemeal during the wars, many Xiongnu continued to fight 
China long after Wudi.  These Xiongnu would continue to fight the Han dynasty until its 
end.  However, it is the Xiongnu, who surrendered to the Han, who are the focus of this 
paper.  The surrendered Xiongnu began a long process of being taken into the Chinese 
empire.  This assimilation shows not only how the Chinese dealt with peripheral groups, 
but also how the Chinese defined themselves.  Before we discuss the cultural 
consequences of the conquest, it is necessary to look at some of its financial and 
economic effects.    
 The surrender of the Southern Xiongnu to the Chinese in 53 B.C.E., although a 
political boon, put a serious financial strain on the Han dynasty.  When the Shanyu, 
Huhanye, surrendered to the Han, the relationship between the two states was 
renegotiated.  Instead of only the Han sending hostages, the Xiongnu would also send 
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royal hostages to the Han.  The Shanyu was also required to pay homage to the Han court 
on a regular basis.  One thing that did stay in the post-Wudi treaties was the gifts that the 
Han gave to the Xiongnu.60 Although instead of being tribute, it was more like foreign 
aid.  It was imperative for the Han to keep the Southern Xiongnu in the years following 
the surrender.  According to Psarras, the Southern Xiongnu were motivated to surrender 
to the Han government in order to gain support in the Xiongnu civil war.61 She also 
asserts that the terms of the treaty did not change; the only thing that changed was the 
political psychology of the Han.62 The Xiongnu, however, bought into the political reality 
as well, by their participation in the annual tributes.  During one of the Shanyu’s trips to 
the Han court, the Shanyu not only received gifts from the Han, but had to participate in 
an audience where he was introduced as a “servant of the emperor.”63 Even though, in the 
early years after the surrender, the Shanyu was treated more leniently than the leaders of 
other states who had surrendered to the Han, this leniency should not be taken lightly.  
While it may seem like a small concession for such a large payoff, it must be 
remembered that this was a time when personal honor and ‘face’ mattered more than in 
modern times.  The Shanyu, who would have grown up within the Xiongnu social and 
political structure where personal advancement was dependent on bravery in battle and a 
Shanyu’s power was dependent not only on tangible things such as money and sheep but 
also on intangible things such as one’s valor and perceived power based on the power of 
one’s enemies, would have known that an act of submission, no matter how slight, was 
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deadly serious.  Even though he was given a ‘loose rein’, the Shanyu would not have 
bowed his head and that of his state without knowing that he was receiving tangible and 
intangible benefits in exchange.  The Xiongnu not only received foreign aid from the Han 
that would free them from the need to raid, they also received the backing from the Han 
government that would give them partial protection from their unsurrendered brethren to 
the north.  The Xiongnu surrendered out of necessity, but stayed in the Han tributary 
system because it was continually advantageous to be part of the Han Empire.  Psarras 
writes that the Xiongnu cooperated with the Han because cooperation was more 
profitable than remaining in the Xiongnu state.64 On the other hand, Yu Ying-Shih, citing 
the Han Shu, argues that the Xiongnu surrendered because their state had been in decline 
since the days of Wudi.65 
 The decision for the Xiongnu to surrender was one that was made in part out of 
necessity and part out of practicality.  Huhanyeh knew that the Xiongnu state was 
collapsing under the weight of civil war, a civil war that was caused by Han economic 
and military pressure.  In order to keep his state together, he needed the gifts to buy his 
subordinates and some sort of legitimacy, through warfare or otherwise.  In bowing to 
China, he gained the gifts in the form of the Han foreign aid, and he gained legitimacy 
with the backing of the Han government.  This legitimacy was not as powerful as that 
gained from fighting China, but was still potent nevertheless and was supplemented with 
gifts that exceeded the pre-Wudi Heqin treaties.  In the fifty years after the surrender, the 
gifts given to the Shanyu of the Southern Xiongnu increased dramatically.66 Also, 
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Huhanyeh brought back from his first homage trip to China 680 kiloliters of grain.67 
Even if a person ate one liter of grain per day, this was still enough grain to feed nearly 
2000 people for a year.  The Xiongnu grain consumption was significantly lower than 
that of Chinese due to their nomadic lifestyle.  This amount of grain probably could have 
supplemented the diets of many more Xiongnu during the year.  The grain given to the 
Shanyu was less likely a personal gift to the Shanyu and more like a subsidy to the 
Xiongnu people as a whole.  The Han were not only supporting the Shanyu and the 
Xiongnu nobility, they were also supporting Xiongnu in the lower ranks of society.  
Supporting the Xiongnu and other barbarian states became extremely costly over the 
years.68 While it may seem that this was a useless drain on China’s resources, it was, in 
fact, a means of holding and sinicising barbarians that would otherwise have been in 
almost constant conflict with China.  Under the Heqin, the Xiongnu would not only extort 
the Han court into paying what amounted to protection money, they would also break the 
treaties that they forced on the Chinese at will.  The Heqin was economically and 
political unsuitable for the Chinese government.  Under the post-Wudi tributary system, 
the Chinese may have had to pay more than the Heqin treaty, but what they gained 
politically was far greater than the economic burden that they had to shoulder.  As a 
tributary state the Southern Xiongnu were much more peaceful than they were as a 
“brotherly” state and were an effective border guard in their own right.  The Han dynasty 
also settled its own inner need to know that it was the greatest power in the region.   
The Han’s generous policy towards the Xiongnu in the early years of the 
surrender also shows a deliberate policy towards bringing the barbarians more fully into 
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the Chinese empire.  During the last years of the former Han the Shanyu was spared the 
need to prostrate himself, while the newly surrendered Xiongnu were also more or less an 
independent state.69 This policy was meant to ease the Xiongnu into the Han imperial 
system.  The ‘loose reign’ would continue for the entirety of the former Han, its fall, and 
the restoration under the Later Han dynasty.  The Later Han would tighten up its control 
on the Xiongnu and bring them more in line with the Han tributary system.  They would 
begin treating the Xiongnu more like Chinese citizens as a whole.70 
The Chinese assimilation of the Xiongnu was a long process that was never fully 
completed.71 The story begins in the Later Han dynasty, when the tributary relationship 
between the Xiongnu and Han was regularized and tightened.  The Xiongnu were 
marginalized politically; from the Shanyu officially becoming a vassal as well as the 
requirement that Xiongnu princes be rotated every year.  Ying-shih suggests that this was 
an attempt to sinicize the barbarians from the inside.72 The Shanyu’s position as a vassal 
was further cemented by the fact that the Han would no longer allow the Shanyu to marry 
a Han princess.73 The Han’s increasing political control over the Xiongnu came in such 
small increments that it is doubtful that anyone noticed the changes.  The increasing 
amount of Chinese political control over the Xiongnu could also be explained by an 
increased cultural similarity with the Chinese. 
While the Xiongnu were becoming more politically beholden to the Chinese, they 
were also becoming more economically dependent on the Han government.  As stated 
earlier, the Xiongnu political system needed a steady flow of Chinese goods to stay 
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together.  These goods were needed to stabilize the leadership hierarchy and supplement 
the nomad economy with luxury goods.  The tributary system dramatically increased the 
gifts to Xiongnu.  This increase was initially meant to make sure that it was more 
profitable for the Xiongnu to stay with the Chinese than to rebel or join the Northern 
Xiongnu again.  However, this increase had the unintended effect of making the Xiongnu 
economically dependent on the Chinese.  This dependence was not fostered by the catties 
of silken floss or gold given to the nobles, but by a substance that is poisonous to the 
nomad way of life, grain.74 
 The Xiongnu’s taste for agricultural products was nothing new at the time of the 
Latter Han.  Di Cosmo states that the Xiongnu had always “incorporated under their 
political control numerous sedentary communities and states from the oases of the Tarim 
Basin to northern China and Manchuria.”75  The Xiongnu no doubt traded with these 
sedentary groups for grain and other things that the nomad economy could not provide.  
This taste for grain was, early on, most likely limited to the nobility as a luxury food.  
Eventually, the need for grain was soon more widespread and was incorporated into the 
Heqin treaties that the Xiongnu Empire had imposed on the Chinese.  Now, under the 
tributary system, the Xiongnu needed grain to supplement their limited pastoral range and 
the weakened political structure.  Early trade, especially in grain, was a very first step 
into sinicization.  Pre-Wudi officials recognized that by creating a taste for Han goods, 
the Han could subdue the barbarians by making them Chinese.  They hoped that the 
goods sent to the Xiongnu would create this need, which would cause the Xiongnu to 
settle down, become farmers, and stop the raiding and political extortion.  It was too little 
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at the time, however.  The goods going across the border were enough to supplement the 
nomad economy, but not enough to supplant it.  Since the Shanyu was still very much the 
head of the Xiongnu, he was the final arbiter of where the Heqin gift would be 
distributed.  By keeping a tight rein on the distribution of the booty gained from China, 
he replaced China as the source of these gifts in the eyes of the Xiongnu nobles and 
people.76 While it was ultimately unsuccessful, the attempt to sinicize the barbarians 
through the Heqin gifts is an early indication of a greater Chinese policy of attempting to 
culturally assimilate barbarians in order to make them part of the empire.  The latter Han 
brought this policy of acculturation to its height.  By slowly marginalizing the Xiongnu 
leadership and creating an economic dependence on Chinese goods, the Han Empire 
slowly assimilated the surrendered Xiongnu. 
 The Han hastened the assimilation of the Xiongnu through the forced migration of 
them to other parts of the empire and the resettling of Chinese citizens into former 
Xiongnu territory.  Mixed barbarian-Chinese settlements appeared in the former 
frontier.77 These Chinese citizens were meant to influence the Xiongnu into becoming 
more Chinese in their habits and customs.  In time, the Xiongnu began to create an 
agricultural economy of their own and began working alongside the Chinese as serfs on 
the estates of powerful landlords.78 The Xiongnu were also eventually held responsible 
for providing labor to Han construction projects, just like any Chinese province was 
expected to do.79 The Chinese sent to settle among the Xiongnu were, however, not 
always loyal Han citizens. At times, they would rise up alongside the Xiongnu against the 
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Han government.80 By the end of the Han dynasty, the position of Shanyu held almost no 
meaning.81 The Xiongnu had become sinicized, although not completely.  There were 
still occasional rebellions and, in the records, the surrendered Xiongnu were still 
considered barbarians.  However, it is reasonable to believe that the barbarians that had 
been completely sinicized were considered Chinese and thus disappeared as a distinct 
entity in the Chinese records.  In the several centuries of the Han dynasty, the Xiongnu 
went from a politically powerful nomadic empire, to subjects of the Han Empire. 
 The Han dynasty’s assimilation method speaks a great deal about the way the Han 
defined themselves as a state and the Chinese defined themselves as a people and as a 
culture.  To be Chinese meant that one followed the customs and traditions of China, 
regardless of one’s ethnic or racial background.82 Since China is a large and diverse 
country with a variety of people and climates, it was seen early on that there was not a 
Chinese “race” so much as there was a common way of life on the Chinese plain.  The 
large agricultural states that arose out of what can be seen as China proper all had a 
similar language, religion and economy.  Though they were separated politically until the 
Qin dynasty, they were unified in a common culture.  This commonality in lifestyle was 
further bolstered by the fact that China was surrounded by regions of vastly different 
cultures:  the steppe nomads to the north, the Nan-yue to the south and the desert nomads 
to the west and southwest.  In the presence of the ‘Other’, the states of the Chinese plain 
saw more in common with each other than the barbarian groups which were often closer 
to them geographically.  This cultural unity was eventually translated into political unity 
when Qinshihhuangdi united all the states.  With this solidarity came an imperial 
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ambition towards all the peripheral groups just outside the empire.  However, this 
ambition was not simply to exploit the conquered barbarians in support of the mother 
country, as so many empires before it and after it had done.  The Chinese ambition was to 
make the barbarians ‘Chinese’.  It was not enough for the barbarian lands to be under 
Chinese political control; it was necessary for the Chinese to civilize these lands as well.  
The Chinese Empire was not just a political hegemony or an economic monopoly; it was 
a cultural dominion. 
 
Gallo-Roman Pre-Conquest Relations 
The primary difficulty in describing Gallo-Roman pre-conquest relations is one involving 
identity. Unlike the Xiongnu, the people that the Romans called “Gauls” had no such 
identity. Moreover, the term “Celt” was a blanket term used by ancient authors to denote 
people living to the North and West of the Mediterranean cultures. Wells points out that 
Hecataeus was the first to mention the Keltoi in the sixth and fifth century B.C.E.83 This 
and other Greek sources give very few if any reasons for their categorization of Iron Age 
peoples.84 It was sufficient for them to simply lump all the northern non-Greek people in 
a category that distinguished them from the Scythians. The Romans would later attempt 
to establish a more complex taxonomy based on customs.85 For example, Caesar and later 
Tacitus would attempt to put the northern Iron Age peoples into more useful categories, 
that is, more for the purpose of conquest and administration. For hundreds of years, these 
accounts have been taken by historians at face value.  The truth of the matter is that the 
peoples of Iron Age Europe do not conform to the descriptions of Greek and Roman 
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authors. Archaeology has shown that the area of Europe beyond Greek and Roman 
control was a mosaic of different groups that were ever shifting and reacting to 
Mediterranean contact.  It can be seen through material culture data that these groups’ 
identity did not match the descriptions of the Greek and Roman authors. 
 This presents a problem when considering the Roman relationship with the 
“Gauls” when in all actuality no widespread Gallic identity existed. It is clear that the 
Romans categorized the people between the Rhine and the Bay of Biscay as “Gauls” 
although those same people did not consider themselves part of that group. How does one 
study the relationship between two groups who make vastly different categorizations and 
assumptions about each other? The only thing that can be done is to go into one’s 
analysis knowing the archaeological data do not always correlate with Roman written 
sources.  
 The geographic region which this paper examines, Gaul, was dominated by two 
artistic styles: that of the Hallstatt and La Tène cultures. Both of these cultures primarily 
occupied the area north of the Alps in areas that now compromise modern France, 
Germany, Spain, and Britain. The Hallstat culture represented the first major proto-urban 
movement in temperate Europe. This group created some of the first hilltop settlements 
and large communities in temperate Europe.86 Graves in the Hallstatt period were more 
lavishly adorned than in earlier periods and it was in this period that Mediterranean trade 
goods, such as wine amphorae, began to show up in burials and at settlement sites.87 
Trade between the Hallstatt zone and the Mediterranean basin primarily consisted of 
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northern forest goods for Mediterranean finished goods and wine.88 The Hallstatt 
‘chiefdoms’ also imported Mediterranean goods and culture as a means of supplying 
prestige goods for the local elite.89 This can be seen in the variety of Mediterranean 
goods found in graves and several Greek style structures (such as walls) found within the 
Hallstatt cultural zone.90 
 In the mid fifth century B.C.E., a new style and identity arose in the Rhineland. 
This culture, known as La Tène quickly replaced the Hallstatt in the archaeological 
record.91 At the same time, large, former Hallstatt centers began to collapse. There are 
several theories of why this collapse occurred, from trade disruption to popular unrest.92 
Wells points out that the La Tène period was a time of “active emigration” to the 
southern regions of Europe.93 It was during this time that Celts came to the Po valley in 
Italy and other regions, such as Galatia in Asia Minor. For example, it is believed that La 
Tène ‘Celtic’ groups were most likely responsible for the sacking of Rome. 
 While these groups were forming their own cultural identity, Mediterranean 
contact was shaping that identity and creating political identity. Wells explains the 
concept of a “tribal zone” or an area where indigenous, non state societies form concrete 
political units as a reaction to complex states.94  These tribes established territorial 
borders and created a solid leadership hierarchy where before there had been none. The 
tribes that Caesar would eventually conquer were a product of these complex processes 
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of internecine warfare and tribal political cycling.95 These Late Iron Age groups would 
play an important role in influencing populations in Italy and in turn being influenced by 
this region in the south.   
In the early 4th century B.C.E. it may have seemed like a ridiculous proposition 
that the small village resting on the hills overlooking the Tiber would come to rule the 
whole Mediterranean world, especially considering its close and powerful neighbors.  To 
the north were the Etruscans.  They were early inhabitants of northern Italy in the modern 
region of Tuscany.  The Etruscans had become very wealthy and powerful from trading 
metalwork for luxury goods.96  Through trade the Etruscans had become thoroughly 
Hellenized.  They took up Greek dress and had Greek manners, although in a distinctly 
northern Italian fashion.97  The Etruscans were the closest to Rome and were the people 
with whom Rome had the most contact, be it hostile or friendly. 
 To the east, in and across the Apennine Mountains, were the other Italian peoples 
that were neither Etruscan nor Greek nor Latin like the Romans.98  People like the 
Samnites or the Apulians who occasionally engaged with the Romans in petty war. Each 
group had its own towns and government that was distinct and independent from the two 
power players on the peninsula.99  These people would eventually be completely 
absorbed into the Roman peninsular dominion. 
 Then, there were the Greeks.  Once colonies of the Greek city states, they had 
either separated from the mother city, or had been severed by the Alexandrian empire that 
was fragmenting when Rome was rising.  The Greeks had been in the southern third of 
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Italy for so long that the area was commonly called “Magna Graecia” (Great Greece).  
The Greek states were the real political power on the peninsula and had touched every 
group on the Italian peninsula.  City-states and tribal groups on the peninsula adopted the 
Hellenistic tradition in terms of architecture, politics and warfare.100  By the time Rome 
became the rising star on the peninsula, the whole of Italy was more or less Hellenized 
with the exception of the Gauls in the northern Piedmont region.  This conquest, 
however, was cultural and not military.  The Greeks had spread their culture through 
trade, an avenue the Romans would later use to spread their own culture.101  The Romans 
were among those that were Hellenized, early on adopting their architecture, politics and 
especially their method of war.  The reason for this mass and voluntary Hellenization of 
the Italian peninsula can be likened to how modern-day, non-Western countries build 
western buildings, conduct their diplomacy in Western dress and have a military in the 
Western model.  These countries imitate the West so they will be seen as modern and 
equal to the larger Western countries and be taken seriously in the international dialogue.  
The people of Italy adopted Greek customs for the same reason; they wanted to be taken 
seriously by the other larger powers in their region.   
      The spread of Greek culture was also the reason for the drastic cultural differentiation 
between the Romans and the Gauls, especially those Gauls who were across the Alps and 
those who were any distance from the Mediterranean shore.  The early differentiation 
would, to a degree, supersede the Romans’ geographical proximity to even the Gauls of 
northern Italy and cause the Romans to align themselves with Greece and the culture of 
the eastern Mediterranean.  However, the Romans who united the peninsula were not 
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completely Greek.  They were still native Italians due to the fact that they grew among 
and then absorbed the other native Italians and the Etruscans.  This tempered the Romans 
and made Roman culture something that was neither purely Greek nor Italian.  The new 
Roman state and its culture was very much Mediterranean and was markedly different 
than the Gallic culture across the Alps. 
 During Rome’s early conflicts in Italy, a battle took place that would sear itself in 
the Roman mind for centuries, namely, the Gallic sacking of Rome in 390 B.C.E.   The 
Romans had been in conflict with a Gallic tribe in northern Italy.  After a brief but 
disastrous pitched battle, the Gauls came into Rome, sacking it and ransoming it for an 
immense amount of gold.  This event is recorded in the histories of the author Livy.102 
However, it must be remembered that Livy is a generation after Caesar’s conquest and 
this event is mentioned in other pre-Caesar texts. The Gallic sacking made a great 
impression on the Roman people. 
 The next significant perceived slight that the Gauls perpetrated on the Romans 
was during the Second Punic War(218-201 B.C.E.).  During Hannibal’s crossing of the 
Alps, the Southern Gauls and those of Northern Italy joined Hannibal’s armies against the 
Romans, who were nominally in control of the region.103  Hannibal’s army rampaged 
across Italy for fifteen years, until he was forced out due to the fact that the Romans sent 
an invasion force to attack Carthage.104  The rampaging Gallo-Carthaginian army must 
have further instilled a fear of the Gauls in the generation that knew the horrors of the 
Punic war. 
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 The last major Gallic/Celtic invasion was only a generation before Caesar.  For an 
unknown reason, two large tribes, the Teutones and the Cimbri, made a migration and 
invasion into Italy in 102 B.C.E.105  Coming out of eastern and central Europe they 
crossed the Alps and came either to settle or pillage the entire peninsula with a two 
pronged attack.  They were eventually defeated and scattered by Caesar’s uncle, Gaius 
Marius.106  This invasion most likely solidified the fear of the Gauls fostered by the other 
Gallic incidents in Roman history. 
 However, Gallo-Roman relations were not limited to the Romans sitting around 
waiting for the barbarians in the North to invade.  By the time of Caesar, the Romans 
already had control of the Gauls of northern Italy and of the southern portion of Gauls 
situated around the Roman colony of Narbo.  The area in Northern Italy was known as 
Cisalpine Gaul and had been a province in the Republic since 222 B.C.E. (Although not 
formally until after the social war in87 B.C.E.).107  The area in southern Gaul was called 
Transalpine Gaul and was founded in 121 B.C.E. in order to provide an overland means 
of communication between Italy and Rome’s Spanish holdings, which Rome had taken 
from Carthage in the Punic Wars.108 The colony Narbo, was founded with little trouble 
by the Romans because the Gauls in the south along the Mediterranean coast had already 
been Hellenized by the Greek traders several centuries before.  Contrary to popular 
belief, Narbo was not an island of civilization among the savages.  The Gauls, among 
which Narbo was founded, could read and write Greek, and their nobility were well 
accustomed to Greek and Roman luxuries such as baths and banquets.  Within thirty 
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years, Narbo was a reasonably sized Roman city; so much so that Cicero would call it a 
“watchtower of the Roman people.”109 Rome had no trouble absorbing Gauls who had 
already been acclimated to Mediterranean culture by the Greeks.              
 There are many Roman authors, writing in both Greek and Latin, who mention 
the Gauls or comment on their culture and history.  There are very few, however, that 
mention the Gauls prior to Caesar’s conquest.  The most telling source that we have is 
Cicero’s defense of Marcus Fonteius, the governor of Transalpine Gaul.  Fonteius had 
been accused of abusing the province which he had been given after his praetorship.110 
This was nothing new for a Roman politician – in fact it was standard procedure.  A 
Roman aristocrat, seeking political power, would rack up huge amounts of debt for his 
political campaigns.  Once his term of office was over, he would serve a term as governer 
of a province, of which, by the 70s B.C.E, there were many.  He would then proceed to 
milk the provincials with taxes until he had enough to pay off his debts and maybe have a 
little left over.111  It seems that Marcus Fonteius had been a little too heavy handed with 
the taxes and the Gauls of Northern Italy took him to court over it.  The sheer fact that 
this case was brought to Roman court reveals some important characteristics of 
Transalpine Gaul prior to conquest.  First, it shows how assimilated the Gauls of the two 
provinces had become.  If the Gauls under Fonteius’ rule were unassimilated, they would 
not have taken their oppressor to court.  The mere fact that they were in court shows that 
the Gauls that Cicero was dealing with were not the Gauls that Caesar would fight a few 
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years later in the Gallic wars.  Secondly, the trial proves that the Gauls obviously 
believed in the efficacy of Roman justice.  They would not have traveled the hundred 
plus miles from Transalpine Gaul to Rome in order to testify at the trial if they didn’t 
believe that they had a chance of winning.  The Northern Italian Gauls, who were 
testifying against Marcus Fonteius, had been living under the Roman system for many 
years and were most likely indistinguishable from any Italian non-citizen provincial. 
 Cicero preys on the Roman jury’s innate prejudices towards the Gauls.  He brings 
up the historical slights that Gauls perpetrated against the Roman people and their lack of 
culture and religion.112 However, he emphasizes a more important deficiency in the 
Gauls,  the fact that they were not Roman citizens.  One of the key aspects of Cicero’s 
defense that is often overlooked is his constant emphasis of the fact that not one Roman 
citizen had come to testify against Fonteius.  While this is scattered throughout the text, a 
specific example can be found in Cicero’s defense of the charge that Fonteius took an 
illegal loan: 
By whom do they [the Gauls] say that a loan of such money was made?  
By the Gauls?  No.  By who then?  By the Roman citizens who conduct 
business in Gaul.  Why have we not heard their testimony?113 
  
Cicero’s emphasis on the provincial status of the Gauls shines a very strong light on the 
Romans’ definition of themselves, in that they defined themselves more legally than 
culturally.  Cicero may buttress his defense with reminders of the Gauls’ historical slights 
and their lack of culture, however, he rests the weight of his argument on the fact that not 
one of the Gallic witnesses was a citizen.  Cicero, a shrewd lawyer, did not do this 
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because of his own peculiar prejudices about citizenship, but rather because he knew this 
would sway the jury.   
 While there were many Romans who held this view of the Gauls, even those who 
were living within Roman territory, DeWitt points out that there were many who had 
good relationships with individual Gauls.114 There were many Roman merchants that 
made their living by trading in Gaul.  These traders were so prevalent that they 
sometimes even founded towns within Gaul.115 These towns would later pave the way for 
Romanization and would facilitate Roman administration after the conquest.  These 
traders also brought Roman goods and Roman culture along with them.  The goods were 
not only traded among the Romans and the Gauls, but between the Gauls themselves and 
beyond.  The archaeological record shows Roman goods in places as far as Britain long 
before the conquest.116 This trade, like the towns founded by the traders themselves, was 
a vehicle for early Romanization.  Unlike the trade China fostered with the Xiongnu, this 
trade was not a deliberate tactic to try to culturally change the Gauls to be more Roman.  
Rome needed the trade with its provinces and beyond to supply her with goods that she 
could not produce because of either climate or local resources.  China, however, was a 
much larger territory that had very little need to trade for goods that they could not make 
themselves.  The Romans, like the Chinese, had a longstanding relationship with their 
barbarian neighbors long before their eventual conquest. 
 Despite the Romans’ reservation about the Gauls’ perceived lack of civility and 
aggressiveness, many Romans also admired the Gauls as a people.  To the Romans, the 
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Gauls seemed straightforward and truthful.117 It is not surprising that many Roman 
aristocrats, who took lying and political backstabbing from a necessity to an art form, 
admired this quality.  There were even friendships between Romans and Gauls that have 
been recorded.  One of the most notable is the friendship between Caesar and his Gallic 
interpreter.118 However, it must be noted that Caesar’s interpreter was a Roman citizen of 
Helvetian parentage.119 DeWitt also says that Caesar speaks respectfully of the Gauls 
when he writes his commentaries.120 It is clear that many were willing to put aside their 
jaded view of the Gauls in order to have good working relationships with them. 
 Politically, the Gauls were in a precarious position on account of both their 
geography and their social structure.  The late Republic was a time of political 
maneuvering and immense personal ambition.  Rival politicians fought each other in 
Rome, trying to keep the state going while trying to bury their political opponents.  This 
is the way it always had been. Nevertheless, it became much more intense and violent 
during the late Republic.  This environment existed mainly because Rome had become 
the major player in the Mediterranean basin.  By the time of Caesar and Cicero, Carthage 
had been razed, the nearby successor states had been subdued, and Egypt had descended 
into such deep dynastic bickering that it could not muster any sort of political power.  
Rome was the major state dominating all of these places.  There were very few states left 
to fight, much less threaten the Republic.  Lacking any great crisis to the Republic that 
could bring them together, the individual senatorial families began squabbling among 
themselves for the spoils of empire.  This was the age of the great upheavals, civil wars 
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and plots that would eventually destroy the Republic and see the Principate rise from its 
ashes.121  In the late Republic, senators would physically attack senators on their way to 
Rome, dictators would proscribe their political enemies and the Tiber would see the body 
of more than one fallen politician.  If Italy was the grand stage of the self destruction of 
the Republic, then Gaul was the wing where the actors waited to come on.  Gaul, 
especially Cisalpine Gaul, was a perfect place for a Roman politico to get away from the 
city and still be near enough to be involved in the politics of the city.  Gaul was a coveted 
prize in the late Republic, and its assignment was often argued intensely.  It was often 
given to powerful men who had finished their one-year consulship and wanted to keep an 
eye on the situation in Rome.  Sulla was given command of Cisalpine Gaul in 80 B.C.E., 
which came after his march on Rome and his overthrow of the Senate.122 Caesar would 
later exploit Gaul as a welcome source of open land to conquer.  Many provinces in the 
empire were not close enough to foreign territory or stable enough to provide a 
springboard for conquests.  Gaul was perfect in that it was close to Italy and the resources 
and recruits that came with it.  Gaul was also a country that was divided along tribal 
lines.  Caesar was able to play off these divisions in order to fight only one tribe at a time.    
 Gaul was also a major political player in the late Republic because of its people.  
The Gauls, especially those of the non-Roman parts of Gaul, were often willing ‘muscle’ 
for Roman aristocrats who were plotting rebellion.  One such aristocrat was Lucius 
Catiline.  Catiline, drawing from the urban poor and the dispossessed rural landowners, 
hoped to stage a coup and make his senatorial faction the dominate power in the 
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senate.123 Catiline was a bumbling, if not energetic, conspirator who not only counted on 
support from the throngs of debtors in Italy, but also had a trump card up his sleeve.  
While Catiline was stumping for plebian supporters in Rome, his agents were gaining the 
support of the Allobroges, a Gallic tribe whose territory was situated just outside 
Narbonese Gaul.  His two principal representatives among the Allobroges were Titus 
Volturcius and Publius Umbrenus.124 Volturcius would confess the plot to the senate in 
exchange for immunity.125 His testimony presented some of the most damning evidence 
for Cicero to exploit during his unraveling of the conspiracy.  Umbrenus was a freedman, 
presumably a businessman, who was one of the stronger contacts with the Allobroges.126 
Cicero mentions him in a laundry list of other conspirators who presumably did not throw 
themselves on the mercy of the consul.127 Umbrenus’ case is interesting in that it shows 
that the Roman traders that were in Gaul around the time of Caesar were not just petty 
merchants, but rich and powerful men who had the ear of the tribal chieftains.  They 
could suggest a course of action to the chief and broker a deal between the chief and a 
non-governmental body in Rome. In exchange for support in his rebellion, Catiline 
offered the Allobroges debt relief.128  The Allobroges knew that if Catiline’s rebellion 
failed, their tribe would face a punitive expedition by the Roman army at best and the 
complete annexation of their territory at worst. However, the Allobroges would betray 
Catiline, and aid Cicero’s ambush at the Mulvian bridge.129   The Gauls, like the Xiongnu 
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in China, were intertwined with their imperial neighbor’s politics.  Often, it seems that 
the barbarian group was more involved in the empire’s politics than the empire was 
involved in the barbarian’s politics. 
 It was politics in Rome that prompted the conquest of Gaul.  The conquest of 
Gaul was not conducted for the greater glory of Rome or some desperate necessity of 
state, but rather for the personal ambition and glory of Caesar.  Caesar, who was 
proconsul after his consular term, needed to settle debts that he accrued over the course of 
his consular campaign.  He had been given a very lucrative province.  It was really two 
provinces – Cisalpine Gaul and Transalpine Gaul or Narbonese Gaul.   
 However, Caesar did not intend to simply milk the province for taxes and pay his 
debts. He intended to increase his political standing at home with a triumph, which was a 
formal ceremony where a Roman general was honored for a victory over a foreign 
enemy.  A triumph granted huge political advantages at home. It could almost guarantee 
election to the consulship and provide a political boost for one’s political associates.  A 
triumph, however, was minor compared to the wealth that a successful conquest could 
bring in.  In the past, a general could bring in tons of gold and silver, wealth enough to 
run for consul many times over. 
 The Senate did not necessarily agree with Caesar’s ambition to conquer Gaul.  
While the Senate was interested in increasing the wealth and power of the state as a 
whole, they knew that Caesar would come back from the wars an extremely rich and 
powerful man.  On top of that, he would have an army that was not only experienced, but 
also more loyal to him than the state.  Under the army reforms instituted by Caesar’s 
uncle, Marius, it was an army’s general, not the state, who was responsible for paying the 
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army and providing for the soldiers after they were discharged.  As a result of these 
reforms, the army consisted mostly of the urban and rural poor, people who joined the 
army in order make a better living than they could make in civilian life.  The average 
Roman soldier under Caesar was out for profit either through pay or the plunder of the 
enemy.  Caesar was the man that they turned to in order to achieve their aims.   Caesar 
would spectacularly conquer Gaul and become the political monster that everyone in 
Rome feared.  Caesar would eventually bring down the Republic and usher in a new era 
not only for Roman Gaul, but for the entire empire.             
                    
Gallo-Roman Conflict 
The Roman conquest of Gaul, when examined in light of the conflict between the 
Chinese and the Xiongnu, invites some interesting comparisons.  First, the Romans, while 
they conquered their barbarian neighbor more quickly, were also fighting a sedentary 
enemy that could not run away from advancing Roman armies.  Second, the Gauls were 
not nearly as politically organized as the Xiongnu.  The Romans did not have to fight all 
of Gaul at once.  At any one time, most of the Gallic tribes were collaborating with 
Caesar against the minority that was fighting him.   
 The most complete source regarding the Gallic wars, and indeed some aspects of 
Gallic life, is Caesar’s own commentaries on the wars.  This poses a problem:  How can 
one trust the description of the wars written by the supreme commander of the Romans?  
Would Caesar not create a skewed picture in order to demonize the enemy to foster 
sympathy for his cause?  While it must be remembered that Caesar is the author of the 
work and that the truth must make way for a good story, it can be seen that Caesar is 
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trying to maintain at least the illusion of complete objectivity.  The purpose of Caesar’s 
commentaries is to inform the people in Rome of his military actions.  It needs to sound 
like a factual account in order to drum up support for his war effort.  He must be very 
careful what he exaggerates.  Caesar does not skew the major facts such as what battle 
took place and who he is fighting, which cannot be faked.  What he does skew and 
misrepresent occasionally are his own motivations for action.  Often Caesar claims that 
he is fighting the Gauls for Roman interests, while he is really fighting for his own.  
Caesar misrepresents these things in order to create a sense among the plebs in Rome that 
he is carrying out this war for them and for their benefit.  Caesar often speaks highly of 
the Gauls, very rarely calling them barbari.130 He does this possibly out of genuine 
respect for the Gauls or in order to make his conquest more admirable.  A man is very 
powerful if he has powerful enemies.  Caesar also takes time to write brief ethnographies 
of the peoples that he encounters in his campaigns.  He writes ethnographies of the Gauls, 
the Britons, the Suebians, the Germans, and the Veneti.  While some scholars doubt that 
these ethnographies were actually penned by Caesar himself, new studies have reason to 
believe that they are legitimate.131 These ethnographies seem to be the ancient form of 
National Geographic; they were Caesar’s way of describing the exotic places people that 
he encountered to the general public back in Rome.  It is obvious that Caesar is using 
second hand information to write some of the ethnographies.  For example, in his 
description of the Germans, Caesar describes a type of deer in the German forests that has 
no joints in its legs and thus cannot lie down or stand up on its own.  The Germans had 
devised an ingenious way to hunt this animal.  They would cut into several trees until 
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they were on the brink of falling.  The deer, unable to lie down, would lean against one of 
these trees, which would buckle, thus causing the deer to fall down helpless.  The 
German hunters would then come by and dispatch the creature at their leisure.132 Caesar 
describes this process so matter of factly that one cannot help imagining the future 
dictator of Rome busily writing the tale while his two German informants walk away 
snickering to one another.   
 Caesar’s campaigns began with the migration of the Helvetians, a Gallic tribe that 
lived around the area of modern day Switzerland.  The Helvetians wanted to migrate to 
the area of modern day Aquitaine.  First they wished to go through Gaul Narbonese, but 
Caesar denied their passage.  Then they decided to go through the territory of the 
Sequanians, a tribe whose lands bordered the Roman province.  Caesar told the 
Helvetians that he would not allow them to go through the territory of a Roman ally, 
despite the fact that the Romans had never meddled in inter-Gallic conflicts before.   The 
Helvetians decided to go through the Sequanian territory anyway, probably betting that 
Caesar would not make good on his threats.  Unfortunately, Caesar did make good on his 
threats, using the reason that he was protecting a Roman ally.  He defeated the Helvetians 
and forced them to return to their villages, which they had burned down in preparation for 
the migration.133 Caesar had subdued a Gallic tribe under the guise of helping another.  It 
was a tactic that Caesar would use many times to ‘get his foot into’ Gaul.   Once he had 
defeated the Helvetians, Germans and the Belgians, he set his sights on one of the 
greatest propaganda victories of the late Republic, namely, an expedition to Britain.  
Caesar’s expedition was the ‘moon shot’ of its day.  Few Romans had been to Britain, 
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which was considered by many Romans to be a mysterious, misty island filled with 
monsters and wild men that knew nothing of civilization.  Caesar’s British expedition 
was plagued with problems from the start and achieved very little, but actual conquest 
wasn’t necessary.134 The prestige of successfully leading an expedition to Britain was 
victory enough.  In Gaul, Caesar tore through tribe after tribe, gaining triumphs as he 
went along.  It was only a matter of time before the whole of Gaul was either conquered 
or an ‘ally’ of Rome.   
 The final drama of the Gallic War was played out on the stage of Alesia, where a 
Gallic coalition, lead by Vercingetorix, would be defeated between their own ramparts 
and those of the Romans.  The surrender of Vercingetorix was probably as monumental 
of an event as Caesar and latter historians made it out to be.  It represented the effective 
end of the Gallic resistance.  Some tribes would remain unconquered even into the reign 
of Augustus, especially the mountain peoples of the Alps.135 By the time that Caesar left 
Gaul in 50 B.C.E., most had concluded that it was a Roman province.  Caesar had done 
what seemed impossible; he conquered vast swaths of territory in a relatively short time 
(58-51B.C.E.).  After his proconsulship, his conquests were comparable with those of his 
principal political rival, Pompey Magnus.  Caesar’s sudden success must have 
strengthened a thought that he surely had, that is, a march on Rome and the dictatorship.  
Roman rule would be lifted for a time while Rome underwent a change of government 
and a bloody civil war. 
 So why did the Gallic tribes cooperate with Caesar in the first place?  
Vercingetorix could not have been the first Gallic leader to see the writing on the wall.  It 
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would seem, from the writings of Caesar, that his Gallic allies were lapdogs willing to do 
his bidding.  It is best seen in the death of Dumnorix, one of Caesars allied leaders who 
suddenly decided to flee rather than be taken to Britain in Caesar’s retinue.   
….  and afterward he [Caesar] sent a large part of the cavalry to pursue 
him[Dumnorix], and he ordered that he be retrieved; if he should show 
resistance and not come forth, then he [Caesar] ordered that he be 
killed….  He, however, having called out, began to resist and to defend 
himself with his hand and to implore the faith of his own men, often 
shouting that he was free and of a free state.  The men, as was ordered 
surrounded the man and killed him.  Moreover, all of the Haeduian 
horsemen returned to Caesar.136 
 
While this is clearly a symbolic passage, (the Gaul serving Caesar surrounding and 
destroying the free Gaul) it does demonstrate the divided loyalties of the Gauls during the 
conquest.  Caesar was able to play the different tribes off one another with one very 
important motivator, fear.  At first, it was fear of external enemies, notably the Germans.  
Caesar allowed the consilium Gaulliae (Gallic council) to convene in 58 B.C.E.137 The 
council asked Caesar’s help in fighting the Germans lead by Ariovistus, who had recently 
crossed the Rhine.  This allowed Caesar to gain the allegiance of the tribes that he helped 
protect.   
 Caesar’s Gallic allies were also afraid of him and his legions.  The battle with the 
Helvetians showed central Gaul what the Roman army could do to its enemies.  This, 
combined with Caesar’s victories against the Germans, put a choice in front of every 
Gallic leader –  either cooperate with Caesar and remain prosperous and intact, or fight 
Caesar and risk having your villages burned and your people enslaved.  For the tribes 
close to the Roman province the choice was clear.  Even if the tribes could unite to fight 
the Romans, their lands would be the first to be ravaged.  It was simply safer to cooperate 
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and hope that one’s new masters were distant.  Caesar and the Roman army conquered 
some tribes without even unsheathing their swords. 
 Caesar’s conquest of Gaul was an act motivated out of political ambition, but an 
act that had profound implication not only for Gaul but for the entire Roman Empire as 
well.  The plunder and veteran army that Caesar gained from the conquest would fund his 
march on Rome and subsequent civil war with Pompey.  The Civil War would be the 
deathblow to the Republic and the birth of the Principate under Caesar’s nephew 
Octavian, later to be called Augustus.  Augustus would pick up where his uncle left off in 
the final subduing of the province and begin the process of Romanization that would 
bring people of the province into the empire not just as provincials, but as Romans. 
                   
Gallo-Roman Post-Conquest Relations and Assimilation 
The process of Romanization in the provinces is a phenomenon that is difficult to fully 
describe but is undeniable in the historical narrative.  As one of the new topics within 
Classical studies, gallons of ink have been spilled trying to define and explain the process 
in which an indigenous culture is supplanted by the culture of its conqueror.  It is a 
monumental task.  The difficulty lies in the fact that scholars are trying to explain a 
phenomenon that occurs at the level of the individual with sources that focus on states 
and tribes.  Romanization was never something that was planned or coordinated by the 
Roman government, it just happened.138  It occurred as a byproduct of the Roman 
solution to the problem of administering a huge empire.139  It came out of the theory that 
by legally making the indigenous nobles Romans, they would rule their own people as an 
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extension of the Roman administration.  By giving the local nobility a stake in the greater 
empire, the Romans thought that administration would be easier.140  Their solution to 
making the nobles Roman speaks volumes about how the Romans defined themselves.  
By giving citizenship to select persons within the process, the Roman government paved 
the way for Roman culture to filter into the province through trade and the example made 
by the nobles.  The Romans, who defined themselves legally, used law to spread their 
culture, while the Chinese used their culture to spread their law.   
 The story of Romanization in Gaul began with Augustus.  It was he who first 
organized the provinces into distinct administrative units.  Gaul was divided into 
Narbonese, Celtica, Aquitaine and Belgium, with the frontier set at the military districts 
of Upper and Lower Germany.141 Any further plans for expansion were dashed on the 
military disaster of the Teutenburg Forest in 9 C.E., where three legions were annihilated 
by German tribes.  The administrative divisions were divided along Caesar’s original 
ethnographic lines that he put forth in the first lines of his commentaries:142 
All of Gaul is divided into three parts of which one lives the Belgians, 
another the Aquitainians, and the third which are called Celts in their 
language, and Gauls in ours.  All these are different in language 
institutions and laws.143 
 
Although the Romans defined themselves legally, they did not ignore culture in 
their administrative planning.  The administrative planning was probably ignored 
by the general populace in the province.  It didn’t matter what province they were 
part of, as they still had to pay taxes.  Instead of a governor in the province, there 
would be several administrators based in the cities.  The cities were another new 
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form of administration.  By basing the administration and civic functions in the 
few cities in Gaul, Augustus shifted the focus in the province from the rural to the 
urban.  This shift was not so much of a paradigm shift for the people in the 
province as one might think.  It must be remembered, that the Gauls lived in 
largely agrarian communities that were dominated by the upper class living in an 
Oppidum.  Moving administration to the cities created a very similar structure to 
the native Gallic hierarchy.144    
 However, the early Roman administrators did not have a blank check to 
reorganize the barbarian people and territory.  It was necessary to be aware of and 
sometimes tiptoe around the Gallic sensibilities when setting up the administrative 
framework of the province.  For example, Drinkwater points out that Lugdunum, 
modern Lyon, was probably chosen as the capital of the province because of its 
unimportance to the local tribes: the Aedui, the Averni, and the Allobroges.145 
Like the Chinese, the Romans had to rule with a light hand in order to keep their 
new acquisition pacified during the early years after the conquest, when the threat 
of revolt in Gaul was very real.  Roman administrators had to make sure that the 
changes they were making did not offend too many people - at least not too many 
important people.146  
That being said, city building in the time of Augustus took place at a 
fevered pace.  Roman cities modeled after those in northern Italy sprung up at or 
near the sites of preexisting Oppida.147 The pattern of settlement shifted 
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dramatically during the reign of Augustus as Oppida were abandoned while 
others were built into Roman cities and other colonies were founded away from 
established population centers in order to conform to the road network.148 These 
colonies seem to be part of an overall imperial plan to install Roman 
administration for the purposes of taxation and census taking.  Many of the cities 
were set down all at once with a consistent grid pattern and circuit walls.149 This 
imposition of urban culture did not seem to incite any major riots or rebellion 
within Gaul itself.  Cities were one of the major vehicles for Romanization, 
although it was not the most important means of Romanization that the Romans 
employed.  What would eventually Romanize Gaul cost nothing and was 
completed instantaneously. 
The granting of citizenship by the Roman government was the greatest 
contributing factor in the Romanization of Gaul.  In the Gallic nobility, 
citizenship created a sense of solidarity with their conquerors.  It enfranchised 
them in the Roman system where they were not just subjects, but community 
leaders and members of the greater Roman world.  Through the granting of 
citizenship, Gallic nobles who were Romans politically became Romans 
culturally.  Citizenship was the gateway into the Roman world, of which many 
Gauls took advantage. 
Roman citizenship was something that was defined in the early days when 
Rome was nothing more than a village.  It was an exclusive club that allowed its 
members to vote and be part of the political process.  Citizenship could be bought, 
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earned or inherited.150  Most residents in Rome who were not slaves or freedmen 
were citizens.  When Rome began to conquer the Italian peninsula citizenship was 
given to select Italian communities outside of Rome in order to cement alliances 
and pacify communities.  Not all villages around Rome would receive citizenship, 
however.  Some towns in Italy were given status as a municipium, an existing 
town that was incorporated into the Roman citizen body.  The Romans also 
founded towns within Italy, called coloniae, which could vote.  
Voting, however, took place only in Rome, which limited voting to those 
near the city and the especially civically minded.  The advantage of citizenship 
did not lie in voting, however.  Citizens were granted several rights that made 
citizenship worthwhile, such as immunity from torture and the right to due 
process.  The most famous example of Roman citizenship rights is probably the 
trial of St. Paul.  When the Roman governor accused Paul of treason he stated that 
he was a Roman citizen and that he appealed to Caesar.151 Since citizens had the 
right to be tried in Rome, he was taken from Asia Minor to Rome to be tried.  
Paul was most likely a noble or wealthy person in Tarsus who was given 
citizenship as part of Rome’s conquest of Judea, similar to many Gallic nobles 
that were given citizenship after the conquest.   
Citizenship could also be earned, most commonly through military 
service.  A non-citizen who served a stint of 25 years in an auxiliary unit (the 
legions were for citizens only) was granted citizenship for himself and his 
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posterity.152  He was given a bronze tablet stating his citizenship, a copy of which 
was stored in Rome.  During the later Principate and the early empire, citizenship 
was one of the main recruiting tools in the Roman auxiliary.  Soldiers would often 
settle next to their camps, creating a settlement of citizens wherever there was a 
camp.   
Citizenship could also be bestowed for exceptional service to Rome in 
some other non-military way.  Often this was connected with the military or 
campaigning.  Sometimes provincial villages that aided the Roman army during a 
campaign would be given citizenship.153 More frequently, however, was the 
practice of bestowing citizenship on individuals who were helpful to the Romans 
somehow, such as Julius Florus and Julius Sacrovir, leaders of a Gallic revolt 
following the death of Nero.  Woolf points out that their nomen of Julius means 
that they were granted citizenship during Caesar’s campaigns or during Augustus’ 
reign.154 The ancestors of these individuals were probably translators or some 
other Gallic support staff for Caesar’s army.  Another leader during that rebellion 
was Juilus Vindex.  Presumably, his family was granted citizenship in the same 
way as the previous two examples. He was a second generation senator and the 
governor of Gaul in 68 C.E.155 In a century, his family had risen in the Roman 
order to the point of being a senator and a provincial governor.  It is an example 
of how completely citizenship could bring the Gallic nobility into the Roman 
system.   
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The nobility was in a very precarious position in first century C.E. Gaul.  
It was very important that they maintained both their cultural Gallic identity as 
well as their legal Roman identity.  Woolf states that the Gallic nobility’s power 
“rested in their ability to act as mediators between Gauls and Romans.”156 They 
found themselves between two worlds, one native and the other Roman.  The 
Gallic nobility’s role as chief and senator would be instrumental in the cultural 
Romanization of Gaul.  In the case of Gaul, legal assimilation preceded cultural 
assimilation.  In the case of the Xiongnu, cultural assimilation preceded legal 
assimilation. 
The cultural assimilation of Gaul is easier to trace than the legal 
assimilation.  The material record provides more evidence of cultural change than 
the literary sources provide evidence for legal change.  There is  no doubt that 
urbanization brought cultural change.  The new civic amenities certainly attracted 
many Gauls to the cities.  Roman trade, which had brought many foreign products 
into Gaul before the conquest, was now an unabated flood.  The new urban elite 
began to consume these products not only for their own personal comfort, but also 
to fit into the Roman imperial culture that was developing during the end of the 
Principate.157 Things which we today associate with wealth and luxury began to 
appear in Gaul and the rest of the Roman provinces: fine jewelry, silver 
dinnerware, ornate furniture, and gaming dice.158 These were appearing all over 
Gaul as a result of the new expectation that the Gallic nobility become Roman 
culturally as well as legally.  This pressure was especially strong among the 
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senators from Gaul, who needed to go to Rome in order to conduct business.  
They needed to maneuver within the extremely particular Roman social world.  If 
one did not conform to the ever-changing cultural norms of the Roman elite, they 
could be denied opportunities, either politically or economically.  The Roman 
social scene fluctuated more often in the early empire than in other periods of 
Roman history due to a dramatic increase in social mobility.159 Provincial nobles 
had to keep up with these ever-changing tastes in order to be accepted outside of 
the province. 
It was not only the Gallic patterns of consumption that changed 
dramatically after the conquest; religion also changed dramatically.  The Gallic 
priestly class, the Druids, was suddenly threatened by the dramatic increase in 
literacy after the conquest.  The Druids were the keepers of the Gallic oral 
religious tradition.  Druid initiates would be required to remember all the legends 
and lore of the Celtic religion.  With the rise of literacy, these traditions were 
being written down and made accessible to all educated Gauls.  The Druids were 
losing their importance in Gallic society.  160 The rise of literacy was not solely 
responsible for causing the Druidic order to fade out, however, as DeWitt states 
that the rise of the Roman constitutional state and urbanization also served to 
distance most Gauls from the priests of their old religion.161  
Gallic religion also shifted in its artistic expression.  Gallic religious art 
before the conquest consisted of abstracted forms and figures.  There are very few 
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representations of the older Celtic gods, due to Druidic prohibition of physical 
representations of the gods.162 This all changed with the Roman conquest.  The 
Celtic gods were represented in much the same way as the classical gods, with 
sculptures and votives that were classical in style but very Gallic in form.  The 
Celtics gods were also syncretized with the Greco-Roman pantheon.  In his 
commentary, Caesar recognizes a striking similarity between the Gallic religion 
and his own.  He states that the Gauls revered Mercury the most but also 
worshiped Apollo, Mars, Jupiter, and Minerva.163 After the conquest, the Gauls 
began seeing the similarities themselves and began to make representation of their 
chief Celtic god as Mercury.  The Gallic images of Mercury were unlike the 
classical images in that he is often depicted with a beard and accompanied by a 
nymph.164 Cultural and religious adaptations like these were the final stages of 
Romanization in Gaul. 
The Roman imperial identity was unique among ancient societies.  It was 
a legal definition, a definition which was based on the idea that the populus 
Romanus was a group that, as Geary puts it, “had a shared history and lived under 
one law.”165 Rome spread that idea among the various conquered peoples, 
enfranchising them and making them a part of the populus Romanus.  This 
enfranchisement gave the Gallic leadership a stake in the destiny of their 
homeland.  These enfranchised Gauls took part in the Romanization of Gaul as 
civic leaders and senators.  Cities brought Gauls of moderate means into the 
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Roman way of life.  With legal enfranchisement came cultural change.  Trade 
brought Roman products and Roman culture to Gaul.  The appetite for Roman 
products increased dramatically during the Principate and early Empire.  Roman 
civic improvements, such as aqueducts and baths, made the Gauls as ardent urban 
dwellers as people in Italy.   
By the end of Roman Gaul, in the 5th century C.E., the people who were 
conquered by the Franks and other, newer barbarians bore very little resemblance 
to the Gauls who Caesar put under Roman rule.  They were urban dwelling, Latin 
speaking, and wine drinking Romans, bearing few differences to the Romans in 
Rome, or any other province for that matter. In fact, when the Franks conquered 
Gaul in 486 C.E., they let the Roman administration run unmolested for a decade 
or more.166  In Gaul, Rome had come with sword and shield, but stayed with 
bronze tablet and wine goblet in hand. 
 
Pre-Conquest Comparison 
There are two factors that make Roman and Chinese pre-conquest barbarian relations 
unique:  the organization of their barbarian neighbors and the environment in which they 
became empires.  These factors created very different trajectories of early barbarian 
relations for each empire.  China, who was strong armed by the Xiongnu until very 
shortly before the conquest, was a victim of the Xiongnu’s organization and their own 
coming together as an empire.  The Romans, on the other hand, had comparably 
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unstructured barbarian relations with the peoples of Gaul due to the loose tribal 
organization of these groups and the dynamic situation of early Italy.   
 China coalesced from various strong, warring states that were all of similar 
culture. The idea of China as a whole cultural region predates the idea of a politically 
unified China.  For the entirety of the Warring States period, nomads from Central Asia 
had been involved in the conflicts of the warring states as auxiliaries.  Some of these 
groups would come together to form the Xiongnu confederation around the same time 
that the Han were rising from the ashes of the Qin dynasty.  The Xiongnu confederation 
was held together by a system of tribute where the Shanyu would buy the loyalty of his 
subordinates with material gifts, while the subordinates would buy their subordinates’ 
loyalty and so on.  The Shanyu’s position was also later secured by his perceived 
resistance to China.  Unfortunately, the state size that this system was able to support was 
dependent upon the amount of gifts that the Shanyu provided.  As the Xiongnu 
confederation increased in size, the amount of gifts increased to the point where normal 
trade was not sufficient.  The Xiongnu resorted to massive raids on China in order to 
acquire the required goods.  To supply a steadier stream of gifts the Xiongnu managed to 
force the Han government into the Heqin treaty, which forced the Han government into 
providing tribute to the Xiongnu.  The Han government was unable to resist these treaties 
due to potential internal problems.  It would be many decades until the Han were able to 
break the Heqin and reverse the tributary system on the Xiongnu. 
 The Romans became an empire amid the different cultures and politics of early 
Italy.  Early Rome was sandwiched between the Etruscans in the north, the Greeks in the 
south and other Italian peoples in the east.  Rome grew among these different cultures 
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and political systems, swallowing them and assimilating them as she grew to encompass 
the entire peninsula.  Roman constitutional identity formed because there was no unifying 
culture in the early Roman Republic.  People who were considered Roman could be 
culturally different.  The only thing unifying the various ‘Roman’ groups was the set of 
laws that emanated from Rome, which everyone in the empire obeyed.  However, the 
Romans were more receptive to some cultures than others.  For example, after the 
Romans had been Hellenized, they were more likely to accept peoples who were at least 
partially Hellenized themselves, such as the Gauls of Northern Italy and Southern France.  
Roman control before the conquest was limited to these Hellenized Gauls. 
 Gaul as a province was very good geographically for the bitter politics of the late 
Republic.  Proconsuls could serve out their terms while being reasonably close to the 
politics in Rome.  Gaul was also a reasonably lucrative province for a provincial 
governor, not as lucrative as some in the east, but lucrative nevertheless.  On the stage of 
the late Republic, Gaul was an exceptionally valuable staging area for political intrigue.  
Gallic tribes could be involved in the internal politics of Rome or provide a threat to 
Roman interests.  Catiline was trying to bring in the Allobroges in his coup attempt.  By 
the Ciceronian Age, however, unless they were aided by Roman force, the Gauls could 
not provide a significant threat to Rome due to their disunity. 
 The pre-conquest relationship of both empires with barbarians was 
fundamental in providing a foundation for their foreign policy towards barbarians 
once they had become empires.  In the case of the Chinese empire, the Xiongnu’s 
aggressive tactics would humiliate the Chinese into attacking the Xiongnu, 
conquering them and destroying their confederation.  For the Romans, their early 
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development as a state created the identity that would eventually assimilate their 
Gallic neighbors.  Both empires would eventually conquer and assimilate their 
barbarian neighbors, but they reached that point in very different ways. 
Conflict Comparison 
The methods of conflict are sometimes overlooked in history.  It is often seen as 
inconsequential to the overall historical narrative.  However, in the case of the 
comparison of the Chinese and the Romans we can glean some valuable information 
regarding the barbarian relations of the two empires by examining the conflicts that they 
had with their barbarian neighbors.  While the conquests were motivated for different 
reasons, they had similar goals and used roughly similar methods to subdue the peripheral 
peoples around them. Nevertheless, these peripheral groups forced each empire to adapt 
their tactics and equipment significantly, such as how China included large numbers of 
cavalry in their northern armies and the Romans adopted the Gallic helmet. 
 China’s conquest of the Xiongnu was largely motivated by their political 
humiliation at the hands of the Xiongnu and their Heqin treaty.  Chinese political theory 
dictated that China needed to be the dominate power in the region.  The Chinese did not 
want the Xiongnu to stand beside the Han court as a “brotherly” state.  The Chinese 
needed to break the Xiongnu power base in order to get out of the embarrassing Heqin 
treaty and to make sure that the Xiongnu were ‘knocked down a peg’ politically.  The 
Chinese were at a disadvantage due to the fact that they needed to fight an enemy in their 
home territory with the weakest wing of their armed forces.  They would need to adapt in 
order to achieve their goals against the Xiongnu.   
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 The Romans, particularly Caesar, were motivated to conquer Gaul for pure 
personal ambition.  The unstable political situation in Rome, Gaul’s strategic position in 
Italian politics, and the quest for personal military glory were important issues that 
motivated men like Caesar to attempt such conquests.  Caesar’s task was not to burn the 
entire region to the ground; rather, it was to bring each of the tribes in Gaul within the 
Roman sphere of political control either through diplomacy or armed conflict.   
 The Chinese, who had not only a nomadic enemy, but also one on unfamiliar 
territory, fought with one clear advantage over the Xiongnu -  vast reserves of resources.  
China simply challenged the Xiongnu year after year with well supported invading 
armies.  In the long run, it mattered very little that the Xiongnu could flee from 
unfavorable military situations if the Chinese could easily replace the losses they 
sustained.  The Xiongnu could not endure this consistent military threat, which lasted for 
decades of annual invasion, as they simply did not have the resources to compete with it.  
These Chinese invasions, though tactically unsuccessful, made significant strategic 
progress.  The strain placed on the Xiongnu by the Han armies began to wear on the 
Xiongnu’s political hierarchy, which partially depended on resistance to China for 
stability.  The once solid Xiongnu confederation began to show cracks as the war 
progressed, finally fragmenting in the 60’s and 50’s B.C.E.  The surrender of the 
Southern Xiongnu was a landmark for China in their foreign policy with the nomads of 
the north and west.  The new treaties with the surrendered Xiongnu were much more 
costly financially for the Chinese, but were politically ideal.  In the end, China had 
fractured and subdued its largest barbarian challenger.   
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 Caesar was facing much the same problem in Gaul.  Although the Gauls were not 
unified in the same way as the Xiongnu, they had the potential for consolidation.  Caesar 
did not have the luxury of attrition as his army of approximately 60,000 was large by the 
standards of the time, but was woefully inadequate to conquer an area that contained 
millions of people.  Caesar had to make sure that he did not spark a pan Gallic resistance, 
which would spell defeat for him in the field and serious legal and political consequences 
at home.  Caesar played off the Gauls’ inherent division to make sure that he was only 
fighting one or two tribes at a time.  He did this by taking advantage of the already 
friendly and allied tribes.  He created the belief that his friends were well treated and that 
his enemies were sacked, enslaved, or worse.  The Gallic tribes drew up along sides, with 
many on the side of Caesar.  Once Caesar had a solid base of loyal Gallic tribes, it was 
only a matter of stamping out the scattered resistance.  Each tribe that Caesar subdued 
increased his allies’ loyalty, or at least their fear of destruction at his hands.  Although 
fighting a different enemy, Caesar’s campaign against the Gauls had similar goals and 
achieved similar results to the Chinese campaigns against the Xiongnu. 
 These two conquests are classic examples of a large imperial state fighting 
less organized tribal societies.  They both encouraged and then utilized disunity in 
their enemies in order to gain an advantage – with the result being that each 
brought a significant new population under political and economic control and 
subsumed new groups within the empire’s borders.   These unassimilated 
barbarians would eventually become integral parts of their parent empire and 
would eventually become absorbed both culturally and legally and acquire a new 
identity as either Romans or Chinese.  The conflicts that brought these barbarians 
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into ‘civilization’ are vital parts of the historical narrative which make up Roman 
and Chinese barbarian relations. 
Assimilation Comparison 
The assimilation of conquered peoples is a problem that all ancient empires had to 
face.  Both Rome and China needed to bring the barbarians that they had 
conquered into their empire.  Each empire’s policy is a reflection not only on their 
views of barbarians, but of their own identity. 
 At first, immediately after the conquest, both empires used a light hand in 
administering freshly conquered barbarians.  They needed to do this to make sure 
that the barbarians stayed conquered.  Being too heavy-handed at the onset would 
simply drive the peripheral groups back into the periphery.  In the case of China, 
they were exceptionally lavish with the surrendered Xiongnu.  When dealing with 
a conquered population that could simply get on their horses and ride away, it was 
necessary to be very generous.  The Han were making it more profitable for the 
Xiongnu leaders to stay with China.  While it may have been a greater financial 
burden, it was by no means a failure.  The post Wudi barbarian policy (it was not 
at all a Heqin) achieved all the goals the Chinese set out for it.  It pacified the 
surrendered Xiongnu, strengthened part of the frontier, and weakened the political 
status of the Xiongnu from “brotherly state”, to a tributary state.  The latter was 
necessary for Chinese imperial political theory.  The Han emperor needed to be 
the most powerful political force in the region and therefore could not allow the 
Xiongnu to exist as a brotherly state.   
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 Rome’s methods were somewhat different due to the different nature of 
the barbarians they were pacifying.  As an urban empire, the Romans not only 
needed to assimilate the people of the Gaul, but the territory of Gaul itself.  The 
Romans urbanized Gaul through a massive building program, replacing Oppida 
with cities or supplanting them with sites elsewhere.  However, the Romans could 
not set up their administration without considering the sensibilities of the major 
tribes of Gaul.  At times they would select inferior sites for provincial capitals in 
order to avoid setting off the tribes.167 This allowed the Romans to set up their 
extensive administrative framework, which they used to provide Roman goods 
that slowly made the Gauls culturally Roman.   
 The Chinese program of assimilation was aimed at making the Xiongnu 
culturally Chinese citizens, who then could be ruled by Chinese laws.  They did 
this through the forced migration of Chinese from other parts of the empire into 
the conquered Xiongnu areas and by pushing Xiongnu into other parts of the 
empire.  The theory was that the Chinese citizens would civilize the barbarians 
with their superior virtue.  It was thought at the time that only one gentleman 
could civilize an entire tribe of barbarians, that is, if he could keep his virtue 
resolute!168 
 In Roman Gaul, cultural assimilation was a byproduct of Roman legal and 
administrative control.  Rome was concerned with putting the Gauls under Roman 
law.  Cultural assimilation followed legal assimilation.  The Gauls became Roman 
first legally, and then became Roman culturally through Roman material culture 
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and the need to fit into the larger Roman imperial culture.  By including the Gauls 
under Roman law, Rome was subsuming the Gauls within their constitutional 
identity.   
 Both empires molded their barbarian neighbors into their own image.  
Their methods of assimilation showed a great deal about what they thought of 
themselves and what it meant to be ‘Roman’ or ‘Chinese’.  By no means were 
these methods of assimilation definitive or even intentional, but their comparison 
demonstrates things that are not otherwise apparent in their singular study.   
Conclusion 
The political domination of one people over another has occurred not only 
throughout time, but also throughout the world as well.  Rome and China provide 
two examples from two different continents.  While these two roughly 
contemporary empires had very little contact with one another, their methods for 
dealing with peripheral barbarian groups that they considered uncivilized are 
similar in many ways.  Where they differed was in the way they assimilated their 
barbarian neighbors, which was due to their different means of self identity.     
 In this age of global trade and terrorism, cultural interaction and change is 
still relevant today.  As transportation improves and populations become more 
mobile, cultural interaction will only increase.  The assimilation of foreign people 
will be a problem that every industrial nation will continue to face in the future.  
By understanding the processes that took place during the ancient periods of 
cultural interaction, we can better understand them as they take place in our 
modern world. Within this thesis we have traced the process of how a large state 
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society interacts with and eventually absorbs a smaller indigenous society. This 
has been achieved through the analysis of two well known case studies. Through 
such studies, it can be seen how indigenous groups solidify their leadership 
hierarchy and their territory in the process of tribaliztion. Once these groups have 
solidified their own cultural identity, that identity is used to interact with the state 
society that had precipitated such cultural change in the first place. Eventually the 
tribe and the state come into conflict, accelerating the formation of identity on 
both sides of the frontier. Military conflict forces both sides to alter their tactics 
and organization in order to successfully conduct a campaign. In both case 
studies, these military conflicts resulted in the significant portions of the non-state 
societies being absorbed into the larger empire. Here the process of cultural 
assimilation is completed by the different administrative policies of each empire.  
 The Romans, who defined themselves through their law rather than their 
customs, assimilated the Gauls by incorporating the local nobility into that Legal 
definition. Incorporating the local nobility into the Roman legal identity allowed 
Roman culture to complete the permeation it had begun during the Iron Age. 
Cultural assimilation in Gaul, therefore, can be seen largely as a byproduct of 
Roman administrative practices. 
 The Chinese, on the other hand, defined themselves by their culture. The 
Chinese attempted to use their culture to aid their administrative structure. By 
moving large numbers of pastoralists to agricultural areas, the Chinese were 
causing the surrendered Xiongnu to not only become culturally Chinese, but also 
to act as effective border guards during the process of their cultural assimilation. 
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These different methods of assimilation are a result of each empire having a 
different means of identity.  
 The subject of identity has been dealt with in various places in this paper. 
The understanding of the formation and the maintenance of identity is key in 
understanding the interaction between state and non-state societies in either case 
study. Both the empire and the tribe were irrevocably changed by this interaction. 
That is, the tribe was instrumental in the formation of the empire’s identity while 
the state was the driving factor in the formation of the tribe’s identity.  These 
forces influenced the pre conquest relations, conflict and assimilation that 
characterize Roman and Chinese barbarian relations. 
 Asymmetric political relations and the concept of the ‘barbarian’ are 
issues that will never disappear from human society.  It is necessary to study these 
forces in the past in order to understand them in our modern world.  Whether it’s 
the American war in Iraq or the Chinese political control of Tibet, these processes 
shape culture and human life.  Like the man that provided motivation for this 
study, we all use history and our own cultural biases to shape our world view.  To 
be good global citizens, we must not only understand current events at face value, 
but also understand the historical and anthropological processes that drive them. 
Today, the Romans and the ancient Chinese seem so distant from us.  We must 
learn from their example if we are to understand our own politics and interactions. 
We must understand the past if we are to move the human community into the 
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